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INTRODUCTION

David Williams was a prisoner confined in the Federal Correctional Institution in Otisville, New York. A diabetic, Williams developed an infection in his foot for which he repeatedly sought medical
care. The prison doctor, however, considered Williams a malingerer.
Even when Willams's infection had advanced to the point that he was
hospitalized, the doctor failed to forward his medical records to the
hospital or even send a note relaying that test results indicated Williams had an e. coli infection in his foot. Willams's foot and lower leg
then became gangrenous, necessitating the amputation of his leg below the knee.
Maurice Mathie was a pretrial detainee in the Suffolk County Correctional Facility in New York. Roy Fries, a correctional officer at the
facility, repeatedly made sexual overtures towards Mathie, over
Mathie's objections. One day, Fries grabbed Mathie from behind,
handcuffed him to some pipes, pulled down his pants, and anally
raped him.
Both factual accounts depict real cases that culminated in lawsuits

filed in federal district court.1 In each of the cases, the plaintiffs
sought damages to compensate them for the injuries caused by correctional officials' actions or inaction. In the first case, Williams, the diabetic prisoner, was awarded $500,000 in compensatory damages.2
Mathie, the sexual-assault victim in the other case, was awarded a total
of $450,000-$250,000 in compensatory damages and $200,000 in pu3
nitive damages.
Since the enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act in 1996
(PLRA), 4 prisoners,jail inmates, and certain juveniles confined in correctional or detention facilities have been subject to an exhaustion
requirement. 5 The PLRA requires these incarcerated individuals to
1 Mathie v. Fries, 121 F.3d 808, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1997); Williams v. United States, 747
F. Supp. 967, 971-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
2 Willams, 747 F. Supp. at 1014.
3 Mathie, 121 F.3d at 818. The district court awarded Mathie $250,000 in compensatory damages and a half a million dollars in punitive damages. Id. at 811. The court of
appeals reduced the punitive damages award to $200,000. Id. at 817.
4 Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66 (1996) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3624(b), 3626, and in scattered sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C.).
5 The PLRA's exhaustion requirement provides as follows: "No action shall be
brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1979 of the Revised Statutes of the
United States (42 U.S.C. 1983), or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in anyjail,
prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
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exhaust their administrative remedies by pursuing their claims
through the facility's grievance process, before seeking redress in federal court.
But what if the prisoner is, like Williams and Mathie, only seeking
damages for allegedly illegal conditions of confinement, and monetary relief cannot be obtained through the grievance process? Must
the prisoner still pursue his or her claim through the grievance
process?
The courts of appeals are deeply divided on this question. There
is a three-way split between the courts. The Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits have concluded that the exhaustion requirement does not apply in this situation. 6 The Third, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have,
by contrast, held that the requirement does, at least generally, apply
in this context. 7 And the Second and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals
have adopted an intermediate position, holding that the exhaustion
requirement sometimes applies and sometimes does not, depending
upon certain aspects of the grievance process. If the correctional officials consider a prisoner's claim and attempt to resolve, in some way,
the problems spawning it, then the prisoner seeking monetary relief

exhausted." Id sec. 803, § 7(a), 110 Stat. at 1321-71 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(a) (Supp. III 1998)).
6 Kg., Rumbles v. Hill, 182 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir. 1999), cer. deni&4 120 S. Ct. 787
(2000); Whitley v. Hunt, 158 F.3d 882, 886-87 (5th Cir. 1998); Lunsford v. Jumao.As, 155
F.3d 1178, 1179 (9th Cir. 1998); Garrett v. Hawk, 127 F.3d 1263, 1267 (10th CIr. 1997).
The Fifth Circuit has now agreed with the recommendation of a Fifth Circuit panel to
reconsider en bane a case in which the court begrudgingly followed the holding in lil|ty.
Wright v. Hollingsworth, 201 F.3d 663, 666 (5th Cir. 2000), rdi en banc granted,225 F.3d
777 (5th Cir. 2000).
These courts disagree, however, on the applicability of the exhaustion requirement to
a claim seeking both monetary and injunctive relief. In l$dtley, the Fifth Circuit concluded
that a complaint seeking both kinds of relief is subject to the exhaustion requirement,
Whitley, 158 F.3d at 887, a conclusion ith which the Ninth Circuit concurs, Christensen v.
Stewart, No. 97-15722, 2000 WL 329204, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 20, 2000) (table opinion, full
text available on Wetlaw)). By contrast, the Tenth Circuit has held that the exhaustion
requirement applies only to the claim for injunctive relief. Miller v. Menghini, 213 F.3d
1244, 1246 (10th Cir. 2000); Florence v. Booker, No. 98-3153, 1998 M7, 694521, at *1 (10th
Cir. Oct. 6, 1998) (table opinion, full text available on Wesflaw)).
7 E.g., Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 300 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. granted 121 S. Ct 377
(2000); Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 70-71 (3d Cir. 2000); Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279,
1286 (11th Cir. 1999), a'fd in part and vacated in part on other ground-%216 F.3d 970 (11th
Cir. 2000) (en banc); Perez v. Wis. Dep't of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 537 (7th Cir. 1999).
In dictum, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals observed that a prisoner would not
have to exhaust certain medical claims for damages if he or she could not recover damages
through the grievance process-namely, those claims in which the harm caused by allegedly deficient medical care had come to an end. Pere-, 182 F.3d at 538. An example of
such a case, according to the court, would be an inmate who claims that a prison doctor's
failure to promptly set his broken leg constituted cruel and unusual punishment, but
whose leg had now healed. Id
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has to exhaust his or her administrative remedies, even if damages
cannot be recovered through the grievance process.,
This Article explores the applicability of the PLRA's exhaustion
requirement to prisoners who are seeking monetary relief only for
their injuries but who cannot obtain recompense through the grievance process. 9 Part I of the Article begins with a general overview of
the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Part II follows with a discussion of
the pre-PLRA and post-PLRA rules of exhaustion for prisoners. Part
III then analyzes the applicability of the exhaustion requirement when
the grievance process does not offer prisoners the monetary relief
they are seeking.
Part IV concludes with recommendations for correctional officials, the courts, and Congress derived from this analysis. These rec-

ommendations, further elaborated in Part IV, include the following:
Recommendationsfor CorrectionalOfficials
1. Correctional officials should revamp their grievance procedures or develop other administrative mechanisms to enable prisoners
to recover monetary relief, when appropriate, without the need for
litigation.
2. Correctional officials should refine their grievance processes
by linking those processes to a structured mechanism for the identification and resolution of systemic problems at the institutional and departmental level that give rise to prisoners' grievances and lawsuits.
3. Correctional officials should evaluate the lawsuits filed by prisoners to determine whether improvements can be made in correctional operations in general and the operations of the grievance
process and the Constituent Services Office, or similar entity, in
particular.
Recommendations for Courts
1. To facilitate the administrative problem solving that can, in
the long term, reduce inmate litigation, courts should work with correctional officials to develop a process for providing copies of prison8 E.g., Odumosu v. Keller, No. 99-0215, 2000 WL 241644, at *2 (2d Cir. Feb. 1, 2000)
(table opinion, full text available on Westlaw)) (noting that "practically any conceivable
remedy" suffices, but the exhaustion requirement does not apply if the program coordinator returns the grievance seeking monetary relief without having reviewed it). In Wyatt v.
Leonard, the Sixth Circuit noted:
Although it makes sense to excuse exhaustion of the prisoner's complaint
where the prison system has a flat rule declining jurisdiction over such
cases, it does not make sense to excuse the failure to exhaust when the
prison system will hear the case and attempt to correct legitimate complaints by providing some remedy, even though it will not pay damages.

1999 FED App. 0356P, 193 F.3d 876, 878 (6th Cir. 1999).
9 This Article does not address the applicability of the exhaustion requirement to
mixed claims for relief-those in which prisoners seek both monetary compensation and
injunctive relief.
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ers' complaints, including those dismissed sua sponte, to the
correctional officials.
2. Courts should adopt and augment statutory construction
rules, particularly the rules governing the interpretation of substantive
statutes inserted into appropriation bills, to encourage deliberative
decision making by Congress and to limit the need for courts to resolve questions regarding a statute's meaning that Congress, in the
first instance, should have resolved.
Recommendations for Congress
1. Congress should revamp its procedures to promote deliberative decision making and to limit judicial involvement in, and resolu-

tion of, policy disputes that Congress should resolve.
2. Congress should authorize a broad-based task force to collect

relevant facts about inmate litigation and litigation alternatives and to
assess the effects of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Congress
should also direct the task force to develop recommendations regarding appropriate steps that Congress, other branches of the federal
government, and state and local governments should take, including
possible revisions to the PLRA, to limit the burdens of inmate litigation in ways that rectify problems in correctional operations and ensure that inmates' legal rights are protected and enforced.
I
THE PRISON LTImGATION REFORM

Acr-A

GENERAL OvERVIEw

The Prison Litigation Reform Act' 0 was attached as a rider to an
omnibus appropriations bill, which was signed into law on April 26,
1996.11 According to its relatively sparse legislative history,' 2 the Act
10

Pub. L No. 104-134, tit. VIII, 110 Sta. 1321-66 (1996).
Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L No.
104-134, 110 Stat. 1321. Senator Dole initially introduced the Prison Litigation Reform Act
on September 27, 1995, in Senate Bill 1279 cosponsored by Senator Hatch, the chairperson of the SenateJudiciary Committee, and Senators Abraham, Kyl, Reid, Specter, Hutchinson, Thurmond, Santorum, Bond, D'Amato, and Gramm. 141 Co'.r. REc. S14,413-17
(1995) (statement of Sen. Dole), reprinted in 1 Bmwtm D. RF.,.ts & WwLUA&.st H. MAZ, A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRISON LrnGArON RErdone Acr OF 1996, Docs. Nos. 12, 13
(1997) [hereinafter 1 RF-Ams & MAI.z]. Two days later, Senator Hatch proposed an amendment adding the language of Senate Bill 1279 to the annual Commerce, Justice, and State
appropriations bill, House Resolution 2076. Id. at S14,626 (statement of Sen. Hatch), rrpinted in I RE.,ws & DNz, sup-a, at Doc. No. 16; id. at S14,756-59 (text of Amendment No.
2838 to H.R. 2076), repnted in 1 RE~as & MNLz, supra, at Doc. No. 17. The President,
11

however, vetoed the conference version of the bil. Id. at H15,1667, ataila!eat 1995 W
750594. The PLRA provisions were later inserted into the omnibus appropriations bill
enacted into law in April of 1996. Omnibus Consolidation Rescissions and Appropriations
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-34, 110 Stat. 1321.
12 A House Report briefly discusses two House bills that were the precursors to the
PLRA-the "Stopping Abusive Prisoner Lawsuits ACt" and the "Stop Turning Out Prisoners
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Act." H.R. REP. No. 104-21, at 5-6 (1995), reprinted in 1 REAMs & MANZ, supra note 11, at
Doc. No. 50. These two bills were incorporated into a broader crime-control bill, House
Resolution 667, approved by the House of Representatives on February 10, 1995. H.R. 667,
104th Cong. (1995), reprinted in 1 REAMS & MANz, supra note 11, at Doc. No. 36; see 141
CONG. Rnc. H1585 (1995).

Beyond the House Report, the PLRA's legislative history consists primarily of isolated
comments of legislators found in the CongressionalRecord and the testimony of witnesses
during hearings in the Senate and House of Representatives that focused, only in part, on
the precursory legislation. For the limited remarks in the CongressionalRecord on the PLRA
and its precursory legislation, see, for example, 142 CONG. REc. S2296-300 (1996) (statement of Sens. Kennedy and Simon), reprinted in 1 REAs & MANz, supra note 11, at Doc.
No. 23; 141 CONG. REc. S19,113-14 (1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl), reprinted in 1 REmis &
MANz, supra note 11, at Doc. No. 22; id. at S18,295-96 (statement of Sen. Abraham), reprinted in 1 REAMs & MANz, supra note 11, at Doc. No. 21; id. at S18,1136-37 (statement of
Sen. Hatch), reprinted in 1 REAMs & MANz, supra note 11, at Doc. No. 20; id. at H14,105
(statement of Rep. LoBiondo), reprintedin 1 REAMS & MANz, supra note 11, at Doc. No. 19;
id. at H14,098 (statement of Rep. Mollohan), reprintedin I REMs & MANz, supra note 11, at
Doc. No. 18; id. at S14,418-19 (statements of Sens. Hatch, Kyl, and Abraham), reprinted in 1
REAMs & MANz, supra note 11, at Doc. No. 15; id. at S14,413-14 (statement of Sen. Dole),
reprintedin 1 REAMs & MANz, supra note 11, at Doc. No. 12; id. at S14,316-17 (statement of
Sen. Abraham), reprintedin I REAMS & MANz, supra note 11, at Doc. No. 10; id. at S7524-25
(statement of Sen. Dole), reprintedin I REAMs & MANz, supra note 11, at Doc. No. 7; id. at
56699 (statement of Sen. Simon), reprintedin I REAMS & MANz, supra note 11, at Doc. No. 6;
id. at E317 (1995) (extension of remarks of Rep. Quinn), reprinted in 1 REAMs & MANz,

supra note 11, at Doc. No. 5.
During hearings in the Senate and House of Representatives, only fifteen witnesses
presented limited testimony about the precursory legislation. Ten of these witnesses gave
statements during the Senate hearing. PrisonReform: Enhancingthe Effectiveness of Incarceration: Hearing on S. 3, S. 38, S. 400, S. 866, S. 930, H.R. 667 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 9-16, 20-101, 107-08, 111-13, 141 (1995) (hereinafter PLRA Senate
Hearing];see id. at 10-11, 13-16, 20-25 (testimony and statement ofJohn Schmidt, Associate
Attorney General, United States Department of justice, Washington, D.C.), reprinted in 2
BERNARD D. REAMs & WILAM H. MANz, LEcISLATvE HIsTORy OF THE PPusoN LITIGATION
REFoRM Aar OF 1996, at Doc. No. 55 (1997) [hereinafter 2 REAMs & MA1z]; id. at 26-101

(panel consisting of William P. Barr, former Attorney General, United States Department
of Justice, Washington, D.C.; Paul T. Cappuccio, Kirkland and Ellis, Washington, D.C.;
John J. DiIulio, Jr., Professor of Politics and Public Affairs, Princeton University; Lynne
Abraham, District Attorney, Philadelphia, Pa., on behalf of the National District Attorneys
Association; Michael Gadola, Director, Office of Regulatory Reform, Michigan; RobertJ.
Watson, Commissioner of Correction, Delaware; and Steve J. Martin, former General
Counsel, Texas Department of Corrections), reprinted in 2 REAMs & M_4z, supra, at Doc.
No. 55; id. at 107-09, 111-13 (testimony and statement of panel member 0. Lane McCotter,
Executive Director, Utah Department of Corrections), reprintedin 2 REAMs & MANZ, supra,

at Doc. No. 55; id. at 141 (statement of panel memberjames A. Collins, Executive Director,
Texas Department of Criminaljustice), reprintedin 2 REAMS & MANZ, supra,at Doc. No. 55;
see also id. at 169-217 app., reprintedin 2 REAMis & MANz, supra, at Doc. No. 55 (documenting

answers to questions of various senators regarding the PLRA's precursory legislation and
including supplemental submissions regarding H.R. 667).
An additional five witnesses and Ms. Abraham had previously testified during the
House hearing. Taking Back Our StreetsAct of 1995: Hearingson H.R. 3 Before the Subcomm. on
Crime of the House Comm. on theJudiciar, 104th Cong. 134-36, 155-59, 208, 212, 215-16, 22223, 246-82 (1995) [hereinafter PLRA House Hearings]; see id. at 134-36, 155-59 (testimony
and statement of Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, California), reprinted in 2 REAMs &
MANz, supra, at Doc. No. 53; id. at 208, 212 (testimony and statement of Robert H. Macy,
District Attorney, Seventh Judicial District, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and Past President,
National District Attorneys Association), reprintedin 2 REvAms & MANZ, supra, at Doe. No. 53
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had two ostensible purposes: to end perceived judicial micromanagement of correctional facilities and to curb the purported flood of frivolous prisoners' lawsuits inundating the courts.13 A summary of key
PLRA provisions, other than its exhaustion requirement, is set forth
below.
A. Restrictions on Prospective Relief
To achieve its first objective, the PLRA limits when courts can
award "prospective relief," defined as relief "other than compensatory
monetary damages,"'u in cases contesting the legality of conditions of
confinement in correctional facilities. I5 The PLRA places additional
limitations on the issuance of "prisoner release orders," 16 which are
commonly referred to as population caps. The purpose or effect of
these court orders is to reduce the size of the inmate population in a
correctional facility. 7 The PLRA also restricts the length of time that
a preliminary injunction can remain in effect in a conditions-of-confinement case. Unless the court makes certain findings prescribed by
the statute, the preliminary injunction automatically expires ninety
days after the date it was issued.' 8
id. at 215-16, 222-23 (testimony and statement of Carl R. Peed, Sheriff, Fairfax County,
Va.), reprinted in 2 RFA.is & MMLwz, supra, at Doc. No. 53; id. at 246-51, 279-80 (testimony
and statement of Patrick Boyle, Detective, Philadelphia Police Department), reprned in 2
REAMs & M&,z, supra, at Doc. No. 53; id. at 253-66, 271-72, 274-82 (testimony and statement of Lynne Abraham, District Attorney, Philadelphia, Pa.), nprinkd in 2 Rnm.s & MAN,
at 267-70, 275-76, 279-81 (statement of Alvin J. Bronstein, Direcsupra at Doc. No. 53; id.
tor, National Prison Project, American Civil liberties Union), reprintCdin 2 RM.ts & MI'zN,
supra, at Doc. No. 53.
Very few of the witnesses' comments during the hearings concerned the exhaustion
requirement. In addition, no Senate Judiciary Committee Report addresses the PLRA or
the bills from which it evolved.
13 H.R. REP. No. 104-21, reprinted in 1 REAM.ts & M'z, supra note 11, at Doc. No. 50;
141 CONG. REc. S14413-14 (statement of Sen. Dole) (introducing S. 1279, "The Prison

Litigation Reform Act of 1995"), repqinted in 1 Rrats &NM,,z, supra note 11, at Doc. No. 12.
14 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g) (7) (Supp. IV 1998).
15 Id. § 3636(a) (1) (A). Under these overlapping restrictions, the prospective relief
must be "narrowly drawn," must "extend[ ] no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right," and must be the "least intrusive means" of rectifling the violation. Id.
16
Id. § 3636(a) (3) (A). A court cannot issue a prisoner-release order unless a *less
intrusive" order has failed to remedy the federal-right violation and the defendant was
afforded a "reasonable amount of time to comply ith the previous court orders." Id. In
addition, before entering a prisoner-release order, the court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that crowding is the "primary cause" of the illegal conditions of confinement and that no other remedy can alleviate those conditions. I § 3626(a) (3) (E).
Finally, only a three-judge court, comprised of at least one court of appealsjudge and one
or more district judges, can issue a prisoner-release order. Id. § 3626(a) (3) (B).
17 Id. §3626(g)(4).
18 Id § 3626(a) (2). The preliminary injunction expires ninety days after its entry unless the court makes the following findings necessary to grant prospective relief- that the
injunction is needed to remedy a violation of a federal right, is "narrowly dram," extends
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Another PLRA restriction on the remedial relief courts can award

in conditions-of-confinement cases can be found in the section entitied, "Termination of Relief.' 9 Under the PLRA's immediate-termination provision, the prospective relief awarded in a conditions-ofconfinement case must generally be terminated, on the motion of a
defendant or intervenor, unless the relief was ordered with attendant
findings by the court that the relief was needed to remedy a violation
of a federal right, extended "no further than necessary to correct the
violation," was "narrowly drawn," and was the "least intrusive means"

of correcting the violation. 20 If the court did not previously make
those findings, the prospective relief must be terminated unless the
court now makes written findings that the relief is needed to rectify a
"current and ongoing violation of the Federal right, extends no fur-

ther than necessary to correct [that] violation," is "narrowly drawn,"

21
and is the "least intrusive means" of remedying the violation.
The PLRA further provides for a stay of the prospective relief
awarded in a conditions-of-confinement case if the court fails to rule
on a termination motion within thirty days of filing.2 2 For "good

cause," the court can, however, postpone the operation of the auto-

23
matic stay for up to sixty additional days.
Finally, the PLRA places a number a restrictions on the appoint-

ment, compensation, and powers of special masters in conditions-ofconfinement cases.2 4 Perhaps most significantly, special masters are
forbidden from engaging in any ex partecommunications with the parties.2 5 This prohibition could potentially hamper special masters' abilno further than necessary to remedy the federal-right violation, and is the "least intrusive
means" of doing so. Id.
19 Id. § 3626(b).
20
21

Id. § 3626(b)(2).

Id. § 3626(b) (3). Even if a court made these findings at the time the remedial
order was entered, the order is subject to termination, upon motion, two years after the
order's entry unless the court, once again, makes the prescribed findings. Id.
§ 3626(b) (1) (A) (i). If the order was entered before the date of the PLRA's enactment,
the order can be terminated two years from that date unless the caveat to termination
found in § 3626(b) (3) applies. Id. § 3626(b) (1) (A) (iii). If a court denies a termination
motion, the motion can be refiled with the court one year after the date on which the
order denying the termination motion was entered. Id. § 3626(b) (1) (A) (ii).
22
Id. § 3626(e) (2) (A) (i). The PLRA's stay provision states that "[a]ny motion to
modify or terminate prospective relief made under subsection (b) shall operate as a stay."
Id. § 3626(e)(2). In Millerv. French, 120 S. Ct. 2246 (2000), the Supreme Court held that
this stay provision does not unconstitutionally impinge on the separation of powers. Id. at
2260. The Court left open the question whether the provision abridges prisoners' due
process right to be afforded a "meaningful opportunity" to be heard on the termination
issue. Id.
23
18 U.S.C. § 3626(e) (3). A crowded docket will not, howeverjustify postponement
of the date the stay goes into effect. Id.
24 Id § 3626(f)(1)-(6).
25
Id. § 3626(f)(6)(B).
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ity to negotiate agreements between the parties when problems arise
while the court's remedial order is being implemented.
B. Curbing Frivolous Prisoners' Lawsuits
The PLRA contains a range of provisions to meet its other touted
objective-to curb the filing of frivolous lawsuits by prisoners. First,
prisoners who cannot afford to pay the full filing fee when bringing a
26
civil action or appeal usually must still pay an initial partial filing fee.
The inmate must then generally make incremental payments each
month thereafter until the balance of the filing fee has been paid
27

off.

Second, inmates who had civil suits or appeals dismissed on three
or more occasions because they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to
state a claim for which relief can be granted must, in most cases, pay
the full filing fee up front when bringing a lawsuit or appeal in a civil
case.28 Only if an inmate is unable to pay the full fee and is facing an
"imminent" threat of "serious physical injury" can the inmate with
three strikes bring a complaint or appeal informa pauperisYThird, the PLRA contains a physical-injury requirementw Prisoners cannot seek recompense for mental or emotional injuries sustained while they were in custody unless they also suffered a physical
injury.3
Fourth, courts must screen prisoners' civil complaints and dismiss
any claims that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, or seek damages from a defendant with
immunity from damages liability. 2 The PLRA authorizes a sua sponte
26

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (Supp. IV1998). The prisoner must pay, as an initial par-

tial filing fee, twenty percent of whichever is greater. (1) the average monthly deposits to
the prisoner's trust-fund account, or (2) the average monthly balance in that account during the six months preceding the filing of the complaint or appeal Id. However, if the
prisoner lacks the assets or the means to pay the initial fee, he or she can still file the
complaint or appeal. i § 1915(b) (4).
27 Id. § 1915(b) (2). Each month, the prisoner must make an installment payment on
the filing fee equalling twenty percent of the income credited to his or her trust-fund
account the month before. Id. However, prison officials cannot forard a payment to the
court if the prisoner has ten dollars or less in the account. Id.
28 Id. § 1915(g).
29 Id.
80 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (Supp. 1I 1997).
31 Id.
82 The PLRA contains three overlapping provisions directing the dismissal of prisoners' claims for any one of these four reasons. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2) (appl)ing to persons
proceeding informapauperisinthe district court or on appeal); id.§ 1915A(b) (appl)ing to
prisoners' lawsuits filed against a governmental entity or official); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)
(applying to cases contesting the legality of prison conditions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or
some other "federal law').
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dismissal on these grounds; dismissal need not, and indeed should
3
not, await the filing of a motion to dismiss.
Finally, a federal prisoner whom a court finds has brought a claim
for malicious reasons or to harass the defendant can lose good-time
credits, thereby extending the length of his or her incarceration. 4
Courts can also revoke credits earned by a federal prisoner who "testifies falsely or otherwise knowingly presents false evidence... to the
35
court."
C.

Limitations on Attorney's Fees

One section of the PLRA places significant restrictions on the attorney's fees that the court can award to prevailing prisoners under 42
U.S.C. § 1988.36 These restrictions are unrelated to the PLRA's purpose of reducing the number of frivolous prisoners' lawsuits because
attorney's fees are only awarded in cases in which inmates prevailed,
cases that, by definition, are nonfrivolous.3 7 Nor can it be said, at least
absent some proof that these cases are prolonged by plaintiffs' attorneys trying to augment their fees, that these fee limitations are directly
linked to the goal of ending what Congress perceived as judicial
micromanagement of correctional facilities.
The fee restrictions include, among others, a requirement that
the fees be "proportionately related" to the relief awarded by the
court.38 Elsewhere, the PLRA provides some concrete guidance concerning the meaning of this proportionality requirement in suits for
monetary relief. If a prisoner receives an award of damages, a portion
of the judgment, not to exceed twenty-five percent, must be paid towards the attorney's fees awarded against the defendant.3 9 If the fee
33

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2) (permitting dismissal "at any time"); id. § 1915A(a)-(b) (di,

recting
on the
34
35

dismissal "before docketing, if feasible"); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) (allowing dismissal
court's own motion or the motion of a party).
28 U.S.C. § 1932(1)-(2).
Id. § 1932(3).

36 Id. § 1997e(d). Section 1988(b) authorizes courts to award attorney's fees to the
prevailing parties in suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and certain other civil rights
statutes. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).
37
But see Madrid v. Gomez, 190 F.3d 990, 995-96 (9th Cir. 1999). In that case, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the PLRA's restrictions on the hourly rates
used to compute the attorney's fees awarded prisoners under § 1988 do not abridge prisoners' equal protection rights. Id. at 995-96. Applying a rational-basis test, the court of
appeals cited the following two governmental interests purportedly served by the fee limiltations: the interest in curbing the filing of frivolous prisoners' lawsuits and the interest in
minimizing the costs of such lawsuits to taxpayers. Id. at 996. While the court acknowledged that the prisoners' claims in that case were nonfrivolous, and indeed meritorious,
the court said that it cannot strike down a law just because "'there is an imperfect fit
between means and ends.'" Id. at 996 n.8 (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321
(1993)).
38 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (B) (i).
39 Id. § 1997e(d) (2).
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award does not exceed 150% of the judgment, the defendant must

pay the balance of the fee award. 40 So, for example, in a case in which
a prisoner is awarded one-hundred dollars in compensatory damages,
the defendants will have to pay, at most, about $149 in attorney's fees
($150 minus a minimal amount to be paid from the judgment itself).
The PLRA also places a cap on the hourly rate that can be used
when calculating the fee award under § 1988.41 The Act directs that
the hourly rate not exceed 150% of the hourly rate under the Criminal Justice Act.42 Under this cap, the maximum hourly rate at which
4
prisoners' attorneys can be compensated is currently $112.50. 3
II
ExiAusTiON BEFoRE AND AFTER THE PRISON LITIGATION

REFopw AcT
A.

Pre-PLRA Exhaustion Provisions

In 1980, Congress enacted the Civil Rights of Institutionalized
Persons Act (CRIPA). 44 Reports of widespread atrocities and violations of the constitutional rights of persons confined in prisons, jails,
mental health facilities, and other institutions throughout the country
provided the impetus for the enactment of this legislation. 45 One
40
41

42

1d
Id. § 1997e(d)(3).
Id.

43 The Criminal Justice Act provides that the Judicial Conference can authorize an
hourly compensation rate of up to seventy-five dollars for attorneys appointed under the
Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d) (1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). The Judicial Conference has approved this rate for both in-court and out-of-court work. AD.%HN. OFFICE OF THEI U.S.
COURTS, REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THEJUDICJAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES

19 (1995). But because of fimding limitations, the seventy-five dollar rate has not been
implemented in most judicial districts. Id.

The judiciary appropriations bill for fiscal year 2000 appropriated funds to pay attorneys appointed under the Criminal Justice Act seventy dollars an hour for their work in
court and fifty dollars for their out-of-court work. Act of Nov. 29, 1999, Pub. L No. 106-

113, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-34 to 1501A-35. In some districts in which the seventy-five dollar
rate has not been implemented because of budgetary constraints, courts are using the
appropriated figure when computing attorney's fees under § 1988 in prisoners' cases. See,
eg., Hemandez v. Kalinowski, 146 F.d 196, 201 (3d Cir. 1998). In these districts, the
maximum hourly rate at which prisoners' attorneys can be compensated under § 1988 is
$105 for in-court work (150% of the $70 appropriated figure) and $75 for out-of-court
work (150% of the $50 appropriated figure).
44
Pub. L No. 96-247,94 Stat. 349 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997 to
1997J (1994), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (Supp. m 1997).
45
S. REP.No. 96-416, at 10-12, 18-19 (1979), rrinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 787, 79194, 799-80; see also S. REP. No. 96-416, at 18-19, rprintedin 1980 U.S.C.CA.N. at 800 ("The
experience of the Department of Justice through its involvement in this litigation has
shown that the basic constitutional and Federal statutory rights of institutionalized persons
are being violated on such a systematic and widespread basis to
-arrant
the attention of the
Federal Government.'" (quoting Hon. Drew S. Da)s, I, Assistant Attorney General, Civil

Rights Division, U.S.

Department of Justice)).
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CRIPA provision authorized the U.S. Attorney General to file civil
rights suits to abate "egregious or flagrant conditions" in prisons, jails,

and other institutions that violated constitutional or other federal
rights. 46 A companion provision authorized the Attorney General to
47
intervene in pending lawsuits brought to curb such conditions.
Another part of CRIPA, found in 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, dealt with a
very different subject: the circumstances under which persons confined in correctional facilities must exhaust administrative remedies
One of the many cases cited in the congressional reports and hearings to demonstrate
the egregious conditions of confinement to which prisoners were frequently subjected was
Battle v. Anderson. 376 F. Supp. 402 (E.D. Okla. 1974), affd in part and rev'd in part, 993 F.2d
1551 (10th Cir. 1993). The Oklahoma state prison system at issue in that case, which was
designed to hold 2400 prisoners, housed 4600. S. REP. No. 96416, at 12, reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 793. Consequently, inmates were forced to sleep in garages and stairwells
and were crammed in 36-square-foot cells that lacked ventilation and hot water and into
which sewage leaked. Id. Violence was rampant throughout the prison system, with one
prison reporting nineteen killings over a three-year period. Id. In addition, prisons were
infested with rodents and insects and lacked even the most basic firefighting capabilities.
Id.
Another case, Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 885 (N.D. Miss. 1972), affd, 501 F.2d
1291 (5th Cir. 1974), documented horrific conditions at the Mississippi State Penitentiary
at Parchman. Some inmates were confined naked in six-foot-by-six-foot cells, which lacked
a light, toilet, sink, bed, or mattress. Id. at 890. Milk of magnesia was administered to
inmates to punish them for disciplinary infractions, and cattle prods were used to induce
them to move or stand still. Id. Broken windows were stuffed with rags rather than fixed to
keep out the rain and cold. Id. at 887. And there were other life-threatening problems in
the prison, including open sewage through which diseases were spread and exposed wiring
which posed a substantial fire hazard. Id.
For these and other accounts of the kinds of unconstitutional conditions that prevailed in many prisons at the time CRIPA was enacted, see S. REP. No. 96-416, at 12, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.CAN. at 793-94; H.R. REP. No. 96-80, at 11-12 (1979); Civil Rights of
InstitutionalizedPersons: Hearings on H.R. 10 Before the Subcamm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and
the Admin. ofJustice of the House Comm. on theJudiciary,96th Cong. 46-47 (1979) [hereinafter
1979 House CRIPA Hearings] (testimony of Peggy Weisenberg, Staff Attorney, National
Prison Project, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation); Civil RightsforInstilulionalized
Persons:Hearingson H.R. 2439 and H.R. 5791 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and
the Admin. ofJustice of the House Comm. on theJudiciary,95th Cong. 8-10, 292-93 (1977) [hereinafter 1977 House CRTPA Hearings] (testimony and statement of Hon. Drew S. Days, 1II,
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department ofJustice); id. at 64, 70.
71 (testimony and statement of Jay Lawrence Lichtman, Deputy Director, Defender Division, National Legal Aid and Defender Association); id. at 118 (statement ofAlvinJ. Bronstein, Executive Director, National Prison Project, American Civil Liberties Union); Civil
Rights of InstitutionalizedPersons: Hearings on S. 1393 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of
the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 95th Cong. 30-31 (1977) [hereinafter 1977 Senate CPdPA
Hearings] (statement of Hon. Drew S. Days, III, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights
Division, U.S. Department ofJustice); id. at 228-36 (testimony and statement of Dr. Bailus
Walker, Jr., Environmental Health Consultant, U.S. Department ofJustice).
46 42 U.S.C. § 1997a(a) (1994). Some of the other institutions whose conditions
could, and still can, support the filing of a lawsuit by the Attorney General under CRIPA
include mental hospitals, juvenile detention centers, juvenile training schools, and other
facilities, outside of elementary and secondary schools, for the care, treatment, or supervision of juveniles. Id. § 1997(1). Additional institutions include those "providing skilled
nursing, intermediate or long-term care, or custodial or residential care." Id.
47 Id. § 1997c(a).
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before seeking redress in a civil rights lawsuit. 48 This provision was
reportedly inserted into CRIPA as a counterbalance to the other
CRIPA provisions. 49 Providing state and local officials with the opportunity, in some circumstances, to remedy constitutional violations and
thereby avoid court intervention in correctional operations was apparently designed to assuage concerns about the Department of Justice

interceding in those operations.5 0
The exhaustion provision, as originally enacted, was quite limited
in scope. First, the exhaustion provision only applied to state and local inmates who had filed a lawsuit under the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 5 1 Federal prisoners were not subject to CREPA's
52
exhaustion requirement.
53
Second, the exhaustion provision applied only to adults.

Juveniles confined, for example, in juvenile detention facilities orjuvenile training schools did not have to pursue administrative remedies
before seeking redress in court for violations of their civil rights.54
Third, the exhaustion provision only applied to adults convicted
of a crime, not to pretrial detainees.5 5
Fourth, not every prisoner bringing a § 1983 suit had to exhaust
his or her administrative remedies. Only if the court found that exhaustion would be "appropriate and in the interests ofjustice" could
56
the court require exhaustion.
Fifth, an inmate's failure to pursue a claim through the grievance
process before filing a lawsuit under § 1983 would not lead to the lawsuit's dismissal. 57 Instead, if the court determined that the case was
one in which the inmate should be required to exhaust administrative
remedies, the court would stay proceedings in the case for up to
48 Id. § 1997e(a)-(b), amended by Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994, sec. 20416, § 1997e(a) (1), (a) (2), 108 Stat. 1796, 1833-34, amended ty Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L No. 104-134, sec. 803, § 7, 110 Stat. 1321-66, 1321-70 to

1321-73 (1996).
49

1977 House CRTPA Hearings,supranote 45, at 54 (statement of Rep. Drinan) (ques-

tioning wimess about why "attorneys general feel so strongly, apparently, that a person
should be required to exhaust his administrative remedies before the Attorney General can
act"); id. at 77 (statement ofJay Lawrence Lichtman, Deputy Director, Defender Division,
National Legal Aid and Defender Association) (asserting that conditioning the grant of
authority to the Attorney General to vindicate confined persons' constitutional rights on
the adoption of an exhaustion requirement is "an unacceptable and unnecessary
tradeoff').
50 Id. at 77 (statement ofJay Lawrence Lichtman, Deputy Director, Defender Division,
National Legal Aid and Defender Association).
51 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1).
52
McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 150 (1992).
53 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1) (amended 1994 and 1996).
54

See id.

55
56
57

Id
Id
Id.
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ninety days. 58 If, however, the matter was not resolved within that
ninety-day period, the stay would be lifted, and the court would re59
sume its processing of the prisoner's claim.
Finally, the correctional institution's grievance process had to
meet certain requirements before a court could mandate exhaustion. 60 The court could only require exhaustion of "such plain,
speedy, and effective administrative remedies as are available." 61 In
addition, either the Attorney General had to have certified, or the
court have found, that the grievance process was in "substantial compliance" with certain "minimum acceptable standards" issued by the
Attorney General under the statute. 62 The statute directed that the
"minimum standards" provide for the following: (1) an advisory role
for staff and inmates at the correctional facility in the grievance process's formulation, implementation, and operation; (2) time limits for
the return of written decisions recounting the reasons for granting or
denying a grievance at each level of the grievance process; (3) the
expedited processing of emergency grievances; (4) safeguards to prevent retaliation against an inmate who has filed a grievance or against
any other person who has participated in the grievance process; and
(5) "independent review" of grievances by a person or persons from
outside the institution. 63
In 1994, Congress amended CRIPA's exhaustion provision by extending to 180 days the period of time that a case could be stayed
pending exhaustion of administrative remedies.64 The 1994 amendments also loosened the requirements that had to be met before a
court could order a prisoner to exhaust his or her administrative remedies. Even if the prison grievance process did not meet the five minimum standards set forth in the statute, the court could require a
prisoner to funnel a claim through that process if the court or the
Attorney General had found that the administrative remedies were
nonetheless "fair and effective. '65

58
59

60

Id.
Id.

Id. § 1997e(a)-(b) (amended 1994 and 1996).
Id. § 1997e(a)(2) (amended 1994 and 1996).
Id. These codified standards can be found in 28 C.F.tL §§ 40.2 to 40.9 (1999).
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(b) (2) (A)-(E).
64 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, sec.
20416, § 1997e(a) (1), 108 Stat. 1796, 1833-34 (codified as amended at 42 U.SC.
§ 1997e(a) (1)).
65
Id. sec. 20416, § 1997e(a)(2), 108 Stat. at 1833-34 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2)).
61
62
63
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The PLRA's Exhaustion Requirement

The Prison Litigation Reform Act modified CRIPA's exhaustion
provision in four significant ways. First, the PLRA mandates the dismissal of conditions-of-confinement cases in which administrative
remedies have not been exhausted. 66 By contrast, before the PLRA's
enactment, courts only stayed cases pending the exhaustion of admin67
istrative remedies.
Second, all "prisoners" contesting the conditions of their confinement on constitutional or federal statutory grounds are subject to the
PLRA's exhaustion requirement. s Federal prisoners, as well as incarcerated juveniles, must now exhaust their administrative remedies. 6 9
70
Third, the PLRA eliminated the cap on the exhaustion period.

Under the pre-PLRA law, courts could defer adjudicating a prisoner's
claim for, at most, 180 days while the prisoner attempted to obtain
redress through the prison's grievance process. 7 1 Now, there is no
defined period of time in which correctional officials must process a
72
grievance to avoid court adjudication of the claim.
Finally, the PLRA deleted the statutory language outlining the
following preconditions that had to be met before a court could require a prisoner to exhaust his or her administrative remedies: the
requirement that the court find that the exhaustion of administrative
remedies would be "appropriate and in the interests of justice"; the
requirement that the administrative remedies be "plain, speedy, and
effective"; and the requirement that the administrative remedies ei66
67

42 U.S.C. § 1997e (a) (Supp. m 1997).
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1) (1994) (amended 1994 and 1996); supra notes 57-59 and

accompanying text.
68
42 U.S.C. § 1997(e) (a) (Supp. 11 1997). Title 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h) defines a *prisoner" subject to the exhaustion requirement as "any person incarcerated or detained in
any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for,
violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release,
or diversionary program." Id. § 1997e(h).
69
Id. The Prison Litigation Reform Act extended the applicability of CRIPA's exhaustion requirement beyond prisoners bringing suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to those contesting their conditions of confinement under "any other Federal law." Id. § 1997e(a).
The lower courts have interpreted this amendment as bringing federal prisoners within the
exhaustion requirement's scope. E.g., Lavista v. Beeler, 1999 FED App. 0371P, 195 F.3d
254, 256-57 (6th Cir. 1999); Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1324-25 (11th Cir. 1998);
Garrett v. Hawk, 127 F.3d 1263, 1265 (10th Cir. 1997); see also 141 Coxo. Rrc. H14105
(1995), repinted in 1 Rr.-is & MIu'%z, supra note 11, at Doc. No. 19 (statement of Rep.
LoBiondo) (asserting that cases brought by federal prisoners contesting the conditions of
their confinement are subject to the exhaustion requirement).
70
§ 1997e(a).
71
See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(1) (1994), amended Irj Violent Crime Control and Law

Enforcement Act of 1994, sec. 20416, § 1997e (a) (1), 108 Stat. 1796, 1833-34, amended b)
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L No. 104-134, sec. 803, § 7, 110 Stat. 1321-66,
1321-70 to 1321-73 (1996).
72 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (Supp. I 1997).
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ther substantially comply with regulations implementing the five "minimum" statutory standards or be otherwise "fair and effective."73 The
only substantive requirement remaining on the face of the statute that
administrative remedies must meet in order for the exhaustion requirement to apply is that the remedies be "available." 74
III
THE

APPLICABILY OF THE

PLRA's

EXHAUSTION

REQUIREMENT TO CLAIMS FOR MONETARY REEF ONLY:
AN ANALYSIS OF CONGRESSIONAL INTENT

Whether or not the exhaustion requirement applies when prisoners are seeking monetary relief but cannot obtain such relief through
the grievance process is ultimately a question of congressional intent,

Did Congress intend that prisoners be required to pursue a claim
through the grievance process when the relief the prisoner seeks cannot actually be obtained through that process? This Part discusses the
extent to which the text, legislative history, and purposes of § 1997e,
other PLRA provisions, and policy considerations help to illumine
that intent.
A.

The Language of the PLRA's Exhaustion Provision

The text of § 1997e(a), on its face, arguably supports the position
that the exhaustion requirement does not apply when a prisoner is
seeking a type of relief that cannot be obtained through the grievance
process. Section 1997e(a) only requires the exhaustion of administrative remedies that "are available." How, one might ask, can a remedy-damages-be considered "available" if the grievance process
does not provide for that kind of relief?
A response to that question might be that an administrative remedy is "available" because the inmate may obtain some alternative
form of redress other than the monetary relief he or she initially
sought.75 For example, an inmate seeking monetary relief might, as a
73

Id. § 1997e(a)-(b).

74 Md. § 1997e(a). The precursor to the PLRA approved by the House of Representafives on February 10, 1995, House Resolution 667, retained the CRIPA requirements that
administrative remedies be "plain, speedy, and effective" and that the Attorney General or
court find that they meet certain delineated standards or are otherwise "fair and effective."
H.R 667, 104th Cong. (1995). However, these requirements were deleted without explanation from the Prison Litigation Reform Act when it was added as a rider to an omnibus
appropriations bill in 1995 and again in 1996. See supra note 11 (discussing the legislative
history of the PLRA).
75

Indeed, that has been part of the reasoning of some courts in holding that the

exhaustion requirement generally applies to prisoners seeking monetary relief, even
though such relief cannot be obtained under current grievance procedures. E.g., Perez v.
Wis. Dep't of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 538 (7th Cir. 1999).
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sort of in-kind recompense, be transferred to a prison closer to his or
her home or to a prison with a lower security level.
One could argue, though, that finding administrative remedies
"are available" because of the theoretical possibility that correctional
officials will find alternative ways to make amends for an inmate's pecuniary loss distorts the plain meaning of the word "available." "Ac6
cessible" and "obtainable" are synonyms for the word "available."7 If
a woman living in a rural area decided to undergo radiation treatment
for her breast cancer but the hospital to which she has access does not
provide such treatment, we would not say that radiation treatment is
available at the hospital simply because there are a number of other
cancer treatments of which she could avail herself there. Radiation
treatment is simply not, in the plain sense of the word, available.
But this medical analogy only goes so far, ultimately confirming
that parsing out the meaning of the word "available" does not fully
answer the question of the meaning of § 1997e(a). For although the
radiation treatment the cancer victim would prefer may not be available, other treatment modalities-chemotherapy and surgery--are. So
the pivotal question is how narrow or broad is the definition of the
item or service whose availability we are assessing. Is it, in the medical
scenario, radiation treatment, medical treatments for breast cancer,
or medical care in general? In other words, the question that needs to
be asked and answered is "What is it that, under § 1997e(a), must be
'available'?"
The answer to that question is "administrative remedies." But the
PLRA does not define what constitute the administrative remedies of
which prisoners must avail themselves before filing lawsuits contesting
the conditions of their confinement. Nor did CRIPA define that
term.
One textual due exists, however, as to the meaning of administrative remedies. Section 1997e(a) requires the exhaustion of "administrative remedies," not of the administrative grievance procedure. By
contrast, § 1997e(b) refers to the "administrative grievance procedure," providing that a state's failure to erect or follow such a procedure shall not be the basis for the Attorney General's filing of, or
intervention in, a lawsuit7 7 The employment of this differential lan-

DicnORv

122 (deluxe ed. 1998).

76

MERRIAM-EBSTER'S CoLLEGIATE

77

42 U.C.C. § 1997e(b). Section 1997e(b) specifically provides: "The failure of a

State to adopt or adhere to an administrative grievance procedure shall not constitute the
basis for an action under section 1997a or 1997c of this tide." Id.
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guage occurred twice-both in 1980 when CRIPA was originally en79
acted 78 and in 1996 when the PLRA was enacted.
It is a classic rule of statutory construction that when the legislature uses certain language in one part of a statute and different language in another part of the statute, the difference in wording
connotes a difference in meaning.8 0 It is presumed that the legislature employed differing language because substantive differences exist between the two terms found in the statute.
This canon of statutory construction suggests that the exhaustion
of "administrative remedies" under § 1997e(a) is not the same thing
as processing a claim through the "administrative grievance procedure." In other words, a correctional institution's establishment of a
grievance mechanism does not necessarily mean, in a particular case,
that an inmate has an administrative remedy for the alleged wrong of

which he or she complains. The grievance process, like a trial, is not a
remedy but a process through which a remedy is dispensed.
The potentially countervailing textual consideration is that the
PLRA deleted certain predicates to exhaustion:8 1 the requirement
that the court find exhaustion to be "appropriate and in the interests
of justice" and the requirement that the administrative remedies be
"plain, speedy, and effective." In addition, the PLRA excised the preconditions for deeming administrative remedies "plain, speedy, and
effective": certification by the court or the Attorney General that the
remedies substantially complied with the minimum standards promul82
gated by the Attorney General or were otherwise fair and effective.
The question is whether Congress, in redacting these requirements, intended that prisoners be required to process their claims
through the correctional system's grievance process even when the
grievance process is the antithesis of "plain, speedy, and effective"when it is prolix, dilatory, and ineffective. For if that is the import of
the 1996 amendments to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), then one might argue,
as a logical corollary, that Congress intended the exhaustion requirement to apply whether or not inmates could obtain, through the grievance process, relief that would compensate them for the alleged
violation of their constitutional or other federal rights.

78 Pub. L. No. 96-247, § 7(d), 94 Stat. 349, 353 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.c.
§ 1997e(d) (1988)) (amended 1996).
79 Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 803(d), 110 Stat. at 1321, 1321-71 (1996) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(b) (Supp. IH 1997)).
80 2A NoRMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUaTION § 46.06 (6th ed.
2000).
81 Supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
82 § 1997e(b) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(b)(1)-(2) (1994)).
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B.

Legislative History

Like its text, the legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) points
in two very different directions. Portions of that history support the
proposition that an inmate need not pursue a claim through the grievance process if that process cannot provide the inmate the relief he or
she is seeking. Other parts of that history suggest othenise. In the
end, the legislative history does little to clarify the legislative intent.
1.

CRIPA's Legislative History

The care with which Congress deliberated before enacting CRIPA
in 1980 stands in stark contrast to its cryptic review of the much more
complex PLRA before its enactment in 1996. The House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice held
seven days of hearings on CRIPA in 1977 and 1979, at which twentythree witnesses testified. 83 The Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution also obtained extensive feedback about CRIPA from fifty-four dif84
ferent witnesses during eight days of hearings in 1977 and 1979.
Much of the discussion and debate regarding CRIPA centered on
the provisions authorizing the Attorney General to initiate or intervene in lawsuits contesting "egregious" conditions of confinement that
were the byproduct of a "pattern or practice" of depriving inmates of
their constitutional rights. 85 While most of the witnesses at the congressional hearings testified about the need for such federal intervention to curb unconstitutional conditions of confinement, the National
Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) adamantly opposed what its
witnesses depicted as federal encroachment on the affairs of the
86
states.
The exhaustion provision was inserted into CRIPA in an attempt
to counter this criticism.8 7 By redressing legitimate grievances that
would come to prison officials' attention because of the exhaustion
83

1979 House CRMPA Hearings, supra note 45, at 5-104; 1977 House CRIPR Hearings,

supranote 45, at 3-283.
84 Civil Rights of the Institutionalized Hearingson S. 10 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm on theJudiciay, 96th Cong. 12-463 (1979) [hereinafter 1979 &nate

CRPA Hearings]; 1977 Senate CRIPA Hearings,supra note 45, at 8-909.
85 42 U.S.C. § 1977a(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); see supra text accompanfing notes
46-47.
86 E.g., 1977 House CR/PA Hearings,supra note 45, at 89-90 (statement of C. Raymond
Marvin, Washington Counsel, NAAG); ht.at 92 (Resolution Adopted Thursday, April 21,
1977, by the Executive Committee of the NAAG on H.R. 2439, Attorney General Intervendon Involving Violation of Inmates' Rights) (urging Congress to reject the proposed legislation "as an unprecedented intervention by an agency of the federal government into the
administration of state affairs and the litigation of local concerns").
87 See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
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provision, state officials could avoid the Attorney General's intervention in correctional operations. 88
If that were the sole purpose of the exhaustion provision-to
minimize the Attorney General's initiation of "pattern or practice"
lawsuits-then Congress apparently did not intend, at least in 1980,
for the exhaustion provision to apply when inmates were seeking
monetary relief but could not obtain such relief through the grievance process. The "pattern or practice" lawsuits that the Attorney
General is authorized to bring under 42 U.S.C. § 1997a(a) are for equitable relief only, not damages. It follows that the exhaustion of
claims for damages would not obviate the Attorney General's assertion
of claims for equitable relief, because equitable relief can only be
awarded by a court when damages are an inadequate remedy.89
There are, however, statements in the legislative history suggesting that the purpose of the exhaustion provision, admittedly inserted in CRIPA to counterbalance the authorization of "pattern or
practice" lawsuits by the Attorney General, was not confined to warding off such lawsuits. At least some exhaustion proponents envisioned
that the exhaustion of administrative remedies would sometimes lead
to the resolution of prisoners' individual claims with which the courts
would otherwise be burdened. 90 And the text of § 1997e(a) as it was
enacted in 1980, which states that the exhaustion provision applies to
lawsuits brought by individual prisoners, seems to confirm that the
purpose of the exhaustion provision was broader than to thwart "pattern or practice" lawsuits; 91 it would also serve to relieve the courts
from the burdens of unnecessary or avoidable litigation in general.
88 See, e.g., 1977 House CRIPA Hearings, supra note 45, at 111 (testimony of John D.
Ashcroft, Attorney General, Missouri) (testifying that while CRIPA will draw disputes into
the courts, the provision for the exhaustion of administrative remedies may help prevent
cases from being "generated unduly" by the Attorney General); id. at 493 (statement of
William D. Leeke, Commissioner, South Carolina Department of Corrections) (arguing
that administrative remedies should be exhausted before the Attorney General brings suit
under this Act).
89 See, e.g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 381 (1992).
90 E.g., 1977 House CRIPA Hearings,supra note 45, at 229-30 (statement of Hon. Ruggero J. Aldisert, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit) (asserting that using 'grievance procedures has the "greatest potential for relieving the pressures on the federal
courts" and that the "exhaustion provision is absolutely essential to any meaningful effort

to alleviate the crushing load on the federal courts").
91 See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1988) (amended 1994). Section 1997e(a), as originally
.enacted, provided as follows:
(a) Applicability of administrative remedies
(1) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (2), in any action brought pursuant to section 1983 of this title by an adult convicted of a crime confined
in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility, the court shall, if the court
believes that such a requirement would be appropriate and in the interests
ofjustice, continue such case for a period of not to exceed ninety days in
order to require exhaustion of such plain, speedy, and effective administrative remedies as are available.
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CRIPA's legislative history, however, indicates that Congress did
not intend that a prisoner be required to exhaust administrative remedies whenever a possibility existed, however remote, that the prison
officials' consideration of the prisoner's claim might yield a settlement offer that would obviate the need for court adjudication of the
claim. The House, Senate, and Conference Committee reports on
CRIPA all underscored that " [ ilt is the intent of Congress" that exhaustion not be mandated when a complaint raises issues that cannot,
92
"in reasonable probability," be resolved by the grievance process.
These comments strongly indicate that in 1980 Congress did not intend to require inmates seeking damages to pursue claims through
the grievance process if they could not obtain monetary relief, at least
absent a showing that there existed a reasonable probability that the
claim could be administratively resolved despite the unavailability of

this relief.
2.

The PLRA's Legislative History

As mentioned earlier, the PLRA's legislative history is very sparse
and most of the PLRA-related legislative materials that do exist bear
on provisions other than the exhaustion requirement. 93 With one exception, there is no indication that Congress even considered whether
the exhaustion requirement would apply when an inmate seeks only
damages and monetary relief cannot be obtained through the grievance process.
The remarks of Representative LoBiondo from NewJersey during
what could only generously be described as the debates on the PLRA4
represent that one exception.9 5 During those remarks, Representative LoBiondo observed that the exhaustion requirement rectified
(2) The exhaustion of administrative remedies under paragraph (1) may
not be required unless the Attorney General has certified or the court has

determined that such administrative remedies are in substantial compliId.

ance with the minimum acceptable standards promulgated under subsection (b) of this section.

92 H.R1 CONF. REP. No. 96-897, at 15 (1980); see S. REt. No. 96-416, at 34 (1979),
repinted in 1980 U.S.C.CAN. 787, 817; H.P. REP. No. 96-80, at 25 (1979).
93 Supranote 12.
94 The PLRA was inserted as a rider to an omnibus appropriations bill for fiscal year
1996. Supra note 11. During sessions of the House and Senate, only a handful of representatives and senators commented, sometimes but briefly, on any of the PLRA's provisions
or those of its precursors. See supra notes 11-12. For additional discussion of the circumstances surrounding the PLRA's enactment, see infra text accompanying notes 244-49.
95 141 Co,,G. Rc. H14,105 (1995) (remarks of Rep. LoBiondo), reprinted in I RA.ts
& M ,z, supra note 11, at Doc. No. 19. At the time Representative LoBiondo made his
remarks, he was ending the first year of his first term in Congress. LADsRsmp DiRxaroaPES, CONGRESSIONAL YELLow BOOK 471 (2000).
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what he described as the "real problem" 96 stemming from the Supreme Court's decision in McCarthy v. Madigan.9 7 In that case, the
Court held that CRIPA's exhaustion provision did not apply to federal
inmates, but only to state prisoners bringing suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.98 In addition, the Court refused to judicially impose an exhaustion requirement in civil rights suits brought by federal prisoners,
in part because damages could not be recovered under the Bureau of
Prisons' grievance procedures. 99
In his comments on the PLRA's exhaustion requirement, Representative LoBiondo underscored that the exhaustion provision, in its
revamped form, "will require that all cases brought by Federal inmates
contesting any aspect of their incarceration be submitted to (an] administrative remedy process before proceeding to court."10 0 Representative LoBiondo's comments tell us that one legislator, out of a

total of 535, clearly intended for the exhaustion requirement to apply
when a prisoner was seeking damages but could not obtain damages
through the grievance process. But did Congress as a whole share
that intent?' 0 ' The answer provided by the PLRA's legislative history
is, as discussed below, a mixed one.
96 141 CONG. REc. H14,105 (remarks of Rep. LoBiondo), reprinted in I REAMs & MANz,
supra note 11, at Doc. No. 19.
97 503 U.S. 140 (1992).
98 Id. at 150.
99 I- at 154. In determining whether the common-law doctrine, under which administrative remedies generally must be exhausted, should be applied to federal prisoners, the
Supreme Court in McCarthy balanced prisoners' interests with the interests of courts and
correctional officials implicated by an exhaustion requirement. Id. at 152. The Court observed that applying the exhaustion requirement to federal prisoners would be burdensome to them for two reasons. Id. First, under the regulations of the Bureau of Prisons
(BOP), prisoners had to meet very short deadlines when filing a grievance or subsequent
administrative appeals, a "likely trap for the inexperienced and unwary inmate." Id. at 15253. Second, prisoners could not recover monetary relief under BOP procedures. Id. at
152. Consequently, according to the Court, prisoners seeking only monetary relief had
"everything to lose and nothing to gain" from a requirement that they first pursue their
claim through the grievance process. Id.
The Supreme Court then found that these burdens were not counterbalanced by any
institutional interests favoring an exhaustion requirement. Id. at 155. The Court noted
that adjudication of the prisoner's claim in the case before it would not undermine prison
officials' management and control of prisons because the prisoner's claim concerned the
adequacy of the medical care he had received, a subject on which the Bureau of Prisons
did not have any particular expertise. Id. The Court also concluded that an exhaustion
requirement would not substantially further the interest in judicial economy because
BOP's grievance process did not produce any "formal factfindings" that a court could "conclusively" rely upon when disposing of a prisoner's claim. Id. at 155-56.
100 141 CONG. REc. H14,105 (statement of Rep. LoBiondo), rprinted in 1 Rmms &
MAmz, supra note 11, at Doc. No. 19 (emphasis added).
101 Some evidence suggests that Congress did not share Representative LoBiondo's
intent. Representative LoBiondo's intent was evident prior to the enactment of PLRA
from the text of a bill that he had introduced several months earlier to override McCarthy
v. Madigan. That bill provided:
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The Exhaustion Requirement's Purpose of CurbingFrivolous
Lawsuits

On the one hand, during discussions of the PLRA, the exhaustion requirement was described as a tool for curbing the filing of frivolous lawsuits by prisoners.' 0 2 During the hearings and limited debates
on the PLRA and its precursors, purported examples 10 3 of such frivolous lawsuits were recited.10 4 These examples included the lawsuit
brought by an inmate who allegedly refused to leave his cell and then
No action shall be brought in any court, by a prisoner in the custody of the
Federal Bureau of Prisons, concerning any aspect of such prisoner's incarceration until any administrative remedy procedures available are exhausted. This section applies to all actions regardless of the nominal party
defendant. Thefact that the administrativeremedies do not indude all the possible
procedures andforms of recovay that are availablein the civil action does not render
such administrativeremedies inadequateor excuse the failure to exhaust them.
Prisoner Lawsuit Efficiency Act of 1995, .L 2468, 104th Cong. (1995) (emphasis added).
The highlighted sentence confirms that Representative LoBiondo did not want the
inability to recover monetary relief through the grievance process to nulii, the exhaustion
requirement. But the fact that Congress did not include similar language in the PLRA's
exhaustion requirement arguably suggests that Congress did not subscribe to, or at least
contemplate, this interpretation of the exhaustion requirement-one that contravened the
traditional rules governing exhaustion. See infra Part HI.B.2(b) (discussing the traditional
rules governing exhaustion).
102
E.g., 141 CoNG. REc. H14,105 (statement of Rep. LoBiondo), reprinted in 1 RnvAts &
MA z, supranote 11, at Doc. No. 19 ("'An exhaustion requirement... would aid in deterring frivolous claims by raising the cost in time/money terms of pursuing a Bivens action.'"
(quoting former Attorney General Dick Thomburgh)); id. at S7525 (remarks of Sen.
Dole), reprinted in I Rx. is & MAu'z, supranote 11, at Doc. No. 7 (stating that the exhaustion requirement and other PLRA provisions "would go a long way to curtail frivolous
prisoner litigation").
103 Based on his experiences as a judge, the Honorable Jon 0. Newman, the Chief
Judge of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, vas skeptical about the accuracy of the

descriptions of the frivolous lawsuits cited as support for the enactment of the Prison Lidgation Reform Act. Hon. Jon 0. Newman, Pro Se PrisonerLitigation: LoahingforNeedles in
Haystack 62 BRooK- L REv. 519, 521 (1996). Judge Newman examined the court records
in four of those cases and found that attorneys general lobbying for the PLRA's enactment
had misrepresented their facts. Id. at 520-22 (contending that the descriptions of the facts
of prisoners' lawsuits contained on lists circulated by attorneys general to Congress and the
media were "at best highly misleading and, sometimes, simply false"). According to Chief
Judge Newman, the prisoners' claims raised legitimate concerns about prison conditions
or operations. Id. at 521.
104 Eg., 141 CoNG. REc. S14,626 (remarks of Sen. Dole), reprinted in I Rnvts & INLz,
supra note 11, at Doc. No. 16 (referring to lawsuits challenging the adequacy of storage
space, a bad haircut, the failure to invite a prisoner to a pizza party, and the serving of
chunky, rather than creamy, peanut butter); id. atS7527-28 (Cost oflnmates'Fritv!ousSuitsls
High, TuCSON CTZEN, Feb. 2, 1995 inserted into the CongressionalRecord by Sen. Kyl), reprinted in 1 RE_-ws & MAuz, supranote 11, at Doc. No. 8 (citing lawsuits brought by Arizona
prisoners, including the prisoner who wanted to be paid the minimum wage for his work
and the prisoner who complained that prison officials had lost his tennis shoes); PLRA
House Hearings, supranote 12, at 135 (statement of Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General,
California) (describing lawsuits filed by California prisoners, including one in which a prisoner complained that his cookies were crumbled and one in which the inmate sought an
injunction and damages because he w-as not permitted to speak to anyone other than the
person with whom he was seated on the bus).
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sued because he hadn't been fed and another lawsuit in which an
inmate complained that correctional officials had mixed his clean and
dirty clothes together when searching his cell. 10 5
i. Furtheringthe Purpose of CurbingFrivolous Lawsuits:
Theoretical Constructs
To the extent that the exhaustion requirement was designed, at
least in part, to siphon off legally frivolous claims from the courts, one
could argue that application of the exhaustion requirement to damages claims could further that purpose, even when damages are not
available through the grievance process. One way in which the exhaustion requirement might curb the filing of frivolous lawsuits is by
placing an obstacle between inmates and courts-an obstacle whose
complexities and attendant delays might dissuade some inmates from
ever pursuing their claims in court. The PLRA's removal of the 180day cap on the exhaustion period arguably provides some textual support for the proposition that Congress intended, through the exhaustion requirement, to thwart prisoners' filing of frivolous lawsuits by
creating obstacles to litigation.' 0 6 And at least one member of Congress conceded that he envisioned that the exhaustion requirement
would hinder the filing of frivolous lawsuits by prisoners in this way. 10 7
However, if the purpose of the exhaustion requirement was to
curb the filing of frivolous lawsuits by placing roadblocks in the path
of inmates trying to gain access to the courts, then we could expect
the exhaustion requirement to have a similarly obstructive effect on
the filing of nonfrivolous claims, including those that are meritorious.
Yet, none of those few members of Congress who discussed the
PLRA's exhaustion requirement admitted-and Senator Hatch, who
was a chief sponsor of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, specifically
denied' 0 8 -enacting the requirement in order to discourage inmates,
through the encumbrances of exhaustion, from bringing even meritorious claims to court.
The application of the exhaustion requirement to damages
claims might relieve the courts of the burdens of processing prisoners'
legally frivolous claims in another way: the filing of the prisoner's
105 PLRA Senate Hearing,supranote 12, at 112 (statement of 0. Lane McCotter, Executive Director, Utah Department of Corrections).
106 See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, sec. 803(d), § 7(a), 110 Stat. 1321-66,
1321-71 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a) (Supp. 1111997)).
107
141 CONG. REc. H14,105 (statement of Rep. LoBiondo), reprinted in 1 RrAMs &
MANz, supranote 11, at Doc. No. 19; see also supra note 102 (citing evidence of Representative LoBiondo's intent that a exhaustion requirement would hinder frivolous prison
lawsuits).
108 Id. at S14,627 (remarks of Sen. Hatch), reprintedin 1 REAMs & M.ANZ, supra note 11,
at Doc. No. 16 ("I do not want to prevent inmates from raising legitimate claims."). See
supra note 11 for a discussion of Senator Hatch's role in sponsoring the PLRA.
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grievance could trigger a problem-solving response or an explanation
from correctional officials that satisfies the inmate to the extent that
he or she decides to refrain from filing a lawsuit. For example, in the
cases cited earlier, correctional officials might delve into the reasons
why the inmate who complained of not being fed had refused to leave
his cell. If he had refused to leave his cell because of legitimate concerns for his safety, appropriate measures might be taken to protect
him, such as a transfer to another section of the prison or a transfer to
another prison. Similarly, if the inmate's claim that correctional officers mixed his clothes together during a cell search was processed
through the grievance mechanism, it might culminate in the issuance
of a directive to correctional officers clarifying the procedures they
should follow during cell searches.
Section 1997e(a)'s touted purpose of curbing the filing of frivolous lawsuits could therefore be furthered by applying the exhaustion
requirement to claims for damages, but only if certain requirements
were met. If grievances seeking monetary relief were summarily denied because damages could not be awarded through the grievance
process, then requiring prisoners to exhaust their claims through the
grievance process would not further the legislation's purpose. But if
the filing of the grievances were to trigger a concerted effort by correctional officials to identify and resolve problems raised in the grievances, including problems in communicating the rationale of
correctional policies, procedures, and practices to inmates, then these
problem-solving initiatives might reduce the filing of claims, both frivolous and nonfrivolous, in court. Simply explaining to prisoners in
dear and understandable terms why, in some instances, corrective action is not possible might ward off other complaints.
In short, correctional officials could structure grievance systems
in a way that siphons frivolous claims from the courts. Thus, to the
extent that the legislative history reveals that one of the exhaustion
requirement's main objectives was to reduce prisoners' filing of such
claims, it is at least arguable that this history obliquely points to the
desirability of applying the exhaustion requirement, in some circumstances, to claims for damages, even when monetary relief cannot be
obtained through the grievance process.
ii. PreliminaryInformation on the Availability of Alternative
Relief

The author conducted a survey to collect preliminary information on the extent to which correctional officials have structured their
grievance processes to provide alternative relief to prisoners seeking
monetary relief unavailable through the grievance process. In a telephone survey of the departments of corrections in forty-five states, re-
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spondents were asked about their grievance procedures. 109 The
survey respondents were asked whether prisoners who file a grievance
seeking monetary relief that cannot be obtained through the grievance process are offered alternative relief if they have a legitimate
complaint about correctional operations or the conditions of their
confinement. The survey respondents were also asked to provide examples of the alternative relief proffered to prisoners.
Table I lists the twenty-four departments of corrections which reported that they provide alternative relief to inmates to whom monetary relief cannot be awarded through the grievance process." 0 The
twenty-one departments listed in Table 2 reported that they do not
provide such alternative relief. Most of the departments which reported that they provide alternative relief cited the replacement of an
inmate's property or the referral of a prisoner's claim to another
agency or entity as the alternative relief made available to an inmate.
TABLE 1
STATES OFFERING WHAT THEY CONSIDER ALTERNATIVE RELIEF

Alabama
Arkansas
California
Colorado

Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Louisiana

Missouri
New Jersey
North Carolina
Ohio

Texas
Utah
Virginia
Washington

Delaware
Florida

Maryland
Mississippi

Oklahoma
Rhode Island

West Virginia
Wisconsin

However, the departments of corrections in a small minority of
these states reported adopting creative measures to provide remedial
relief to a prisoner or to rectify the problem underlying the prisoner's
claim. In Colorado, staff determine if a "double-up" is possible. For
example, if an inmate missed a meal, staff let him eat an extra meal

the next week. Regardless of the relief requested by Georgia prison109 The departments of corrections in the following states participated in this survey,
which was completed, under the author's supervision, in March, 2000 by Thaddeus Bringas, a law student at the University of Illinois College of Lav: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, NewJersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. The other five states either did not respond to requests to participate in die
survey or refused to participate. Telephone Survey by Thaddeus Bringas with state corrections departments (Mar. 2000) [hereinafter Grievance Procedure Survey]. In three of the
participating states, the departments of corrections identified someone from outside the
department to be interviewed-an assistant attorney general in Delavare, a deputy attorney general in Idaho, and an administrative law judge in Utah.
110 These reports were not independently verified during this study.
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TABLE

2

STATES THAT DO NOT OFFER ALTERNATIVE RELEF

Arizona
Hawaii
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas

Kentucky
Maine
Michigan
Montana
Nebraska

Nevada
New Hampshire
New York
North Dakota
Oregon

Pennsylvania
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Vermont
Wyoming

ers, grievance officials determine whether staff have complied with the
relevant policies and, if not, confirm that corrective actions are taken
to ensure future compliance. Missouri officials may reassign the prisoner who filed the grievance to a new job or change the prisoner's
classification, and prisoners in Oklahoma may have their custody level
changed or receive access to a requested service or program. Texas
officials report that they take steps to correct problems in living conditions brought to their attention through grievances. In Virginia, the
grievance committee examines the substance of the policy at issue in a
grievance, the way in which it was interpreted and applied, and the
procedures in place to implement the policy to determine whether
the policy or procedures need to be changed. In addition, the committee works with the inmate to identify what might suffice as substitute relief. Finally, the filing of a grievance in Washington may result
in corrective action being taken against a staff member, the referral of
the prisoner to another doctor or mental health counselor for care
and treatment, or the amendment of a policy or modification of the
practices through which a given policy is implemented."'
b.

TraditionalExhaustion Rules

The legislative history also contains a possible contrary sign-a
sign that the exhaustion requirement should not apply when prisoners are seeking relief that cannot be obtained through the grievance
process. During congressional hearings, the Department of Justice
described the PLRA's amendments to § 1997e(a) as having the effect
of bringing the exhaustion requirement that applies to prisoners into
conformance with other exhaustion requirements, a description with
which no member of Congress took issue.1 12 If this is true, then, as
111 Memorandum from Larry Uribe, Grievance Program Manager, Office of Correctional Operations, Washington Department of Corrections, to the author (Mar. 13, 2000)
(on file with author).
112 PLRA Senate Hearing,supranote 12, at 20-21 (statement ofJohn R Schmidt, Assocate Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice) (stating that the Act 'strengthens the
administrative exhaustion rule in this context-and brings it more into line vith admlnis-
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discussed below, the rules that have traditionally applied to exhaustion requirements counsel against applying the PLRA's exhaustion requirement to claims for relief that cannot be obtained through the
grievance process.
In interpreting other exhaustion requirements, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that the exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required when exhaustion would be "futile" or the administrative remedies are "inadequate." ' 3 The plaintiff who wishes to be
exempted from an exhaustion requirement, however, has the burden
of proving that pursuit of the remedies would be futile or that the
remedies are inadequate. 114 By contrast, under CRIPA, before its
amendment by the PLRA, a court could not require a prisoner to exhaust administrative remedies unless the prison officials had succeeded in getting the grievance process certified or had otherwise
demonstrated, to the court's or the Attorney General's satisfaction,
that the grievance process was "fair and effective." 115
In applying the longstanding "futility exception" to exhaustion
requirements, courts generally have not required the exhaustion of
administrative remedies when the relief a party was seeking could not
be obtained through the administrative review process. For example,
in Reiter v. Cooper,116 the bankruptcy trustee for a motor common car-

rier filed suit seeking to recover money from shippers who had paid
less than the applicable tariff rates on certain shipments. 117 The shippers, however, counterclaimed, contending that the carrier's rates
were unreasonable and hence in violation of the Interstate Commerce
Act.118
The trustee argued that the shippers must first bring this claim
before the Interstate Commerce Commission, which had the authority
to determine the reasonable tariff rate. 1 9 The Supreme Court, however, noted that the Interstate Commerce Commission had no power
to grant the reparations sought by the shippers.' 20 Consequently, the
trative exhaustion rules that apply in other contexts-by generally prohibiting prisoner
§ 1983 suits until administrative remedies are exhausted").
113 E.g., Coit Independence Joint Venture v. Fed. Say. and Loan Ins. Corp., 489 U.S.
561, 587 (1989); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 327 (1988); Glover v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co.,

393 U.S. 324, 330 (1969).
114
Honig 484 U.S. at 327.
115 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2) (1994), amended by Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, sec. 20416, § 1997e (a) (2), 108 Stat. 1796, 1833-34, amended by
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, sec. 803, § 7, 110 Stat. 1321-66,
1321-70 to 1321-73 (1996); see also supra notes 62-63, 65 and accompanying text (discussing

the minimum standards for certification and the alternative "fair and effective" finding),
116

507 U.S. 258 (1993).

117

Id. at 262.

118
119

Id.

120

Id. at 268-69.
Id. at 269.
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Supreme Court held that the shippers need not pursue the claim
before the Interstate Commerce Commission as a precondition to filing the claim in court.' 2' Instead, the court could refer the matter to
the Interstate Commerce Commission for a determination of rate rea22
sonableness after the claim had been filed.'
The Supreme Court in Reiter acknowledged that even though the
Interstate Commerce Commission had no power to grant reparations
relief, the Interstate Commerce Act might have required the issue of
rate reasonableness to be determined by the Commission before a
claim could be filed in court.123 But the Court refused to find that

Congress had intended for there to be such mandatory pre-suit administrative processing of a claim. 124 The Court noted that the statute
of limitations began to run at the time a shipment was delivered, not
at the time the Interstate Commerce Commission rendered its decision.12 The Court was therefore reluctant to find that the Interstate
Commerce Act required exhaustion when a claimant could not obtain
monetary relief from the Interstate Commerce Commission and
might be foreclosed from obtaining that relief from a court because
the limitations period had expired while the Interstate Commerce
12 6
Commission made the reasonable-rate determination.
Other Supreme Court cases have also held that a claimant need
not pursue relief in an alternative forum when the relief the claimant
is seeking cannot be obtained in that forum. In Clayton v. International
Union, UAW,127 an employee claimed that he had been discharged in
violation of a collective bargaining agreement and that the union had
breached its duty of fair representation in his dispute with his employer.' 2 8 The Supreme Court considered whether the employee was
required to exhaust internal union appeals procedures before filing a
lawsuit against the employer and union under section 301(a) of the
Labor Management Relations Act' 29
The plaintiff in Clayton sought both reinstatement to his job and
monetary relief.' 3 0 The Supreme Court conceded that the exhaustion
of the internal union procedures might culminate in an award of
monetary relief to the plaintiff.' 3 ' In addition, exhaustion might
thwart the filing of a lawsuit, either by clarif~4ng for the claimant why
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131

Id. at 269-70.
I& at 269.
I& at 269-70.
Id. at 270.
Id
Id.
451 U.S. 679 (1981).
Id. at 682.
Id. at 681-82.
Id. at 690.
Id.
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his claim was without merit or by triggering a settlement offer that
would forestall litigation.' 3 2 However, because exhaustion of the
union procedures could not result in the plaintiff's reinstatement to
his job, the Supreme Court refused to require exhaustion of the
union remedies. 13 3 The Court described the internal union procedures as "inadequate" and exhaustion as a "useless gesture" because
the plaintiff would still need to file a lawsuit to obtain the "complete
relief' he was pursuing under section 301.134

Another arguably relevant Supreme Court case is Parisiv,Davidson.13 5

Technically, the principal question before the Court in Parisi
did not involve the exhaustion doctrine. 3 6 However, the case does
provide insight into what the Supreme Court has considered a "remedy" in the past.
The question in Parisiwas whether a serviceman claiming to be a
conscientious objector could pursue a discharge from the Army in a
habeas corpus action when he could raise his conscientious-objector
status as a defense in a pending court-martial proceeding. 3 7 The Supreme Court noted that while the serviceman could assert his conscientious-objector status as a defense to the criminal charge, he could
not obtain the relief he was seeking, a discharge from the Army, from
the military tribunal. 13 8 Consequently, the Supreme Court said that it
would not require the exhaustion of a "remedy" that did not, in fact,
39
exist.'
Another, though older, Supreme Court case also bears noting. In
Case v. Beauregard,14° the Supreme Court dealt with another wellknown exhaustion requirement-the requirement that legal remedies
be exhausted before pursuing a claim for equitable relief.'4 ' Traditionally, that rule required that before a court of equity could direct
that a debtor's property be used to pay a debt, a creditor had to first
obtain ajudgment against the debtor in a court of law and be unsuc-

cessful in executing the judgment. 142 In Case, however, the Supreme
Court held that legal remedies would sometimes be deemed exhausted even when the plaintiff did not adduce evidence of a fruitless
132

I& at 689.

133

Id. at 696.
Id. at 685, 692-93.
405 U.S. 34 (1972).

34

135

See id at 40.
I& at 39-40.
Id at 43.
Id. at 44. The Court stated that the serviceman "cannot 'properly be required to
exhaust a remedy which may not exist'" Id. (quoting Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683, 698 n.1 1
136
137
138
139

(1969)).
140
141

142

101 U.S. 688 (1879).
Id. at 690.,
See id.
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execution on ajudgment. 14 When the debtor was insolvent and execution would be "meaningless," the remedy at law would be considered inadequate, thereby permitting immediate resort to the court in
equity for relief.'44
To the limited extent that the PLRA's legislative history indicates
that Congress designed the amendments to CRIPA's exhaustion provision to bring that provision into line with other exhaustion requirements, 145 the backdrop of Supreme Court cases against which
Congress enacted the PLRA suggests that the exhaustion requirement
does not apply when a prisoner is seeking only monetary relief and
the prisoner cannot obtain this relief through the grievance process.
If this interpretation of the PLRA's legislative history is correct, then
Congress, by deleting the reference to "plain, speedy, and effective
remedies" and the certification requirements, did not mean to suggest
that prisoners should be required to exhaust procedures that would
be ineffective in remedying the harm caused by an alleged violation of
the prisoners' constitutional or other federal rights. Nor did Congress
intend to deviate from the prevailing rule that the exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required when those remedies are inadequate or when the relief sought by a claimant cannot be obtained
through the administrative process. Instead, these modifications to
§ 1997e(a) were procedural in nature, shifting the burden of proof on

the issue of the adequacy of the administrative remedies from the
prison officials to the party on whom the burden has traditionally
rested-the plaintiffC. The Purposes of Exhaustion Requirements
The purposes of exhaustion requirements can help clarify Congress's intent in enacting an exhaustion requirement. It is unlikely
that Congress would have intended for the requirement to apply
when the exhaustion of administrative remedies would not serve the
usual purposes of exhaustion. According to the Supreme Court, exhaustion requirements have two principal purposes. 146 The first purpose is to protect the administrative agency's authority by giving the
agency the first opportunity to resolve a controversy before a court
intervenes in the dispute. 47 The second purpose is to promote judicial efficiency. 148
143

Id at 691.
IR at 690-91.
145
PLRA Senate Hearing;supranote 12, at 20-21 (statement ofJohn R. Schmidt, Assodate Attorney General, U.S. Department ofJustice); see also supranote 112 and accompan)ing text (discussing this legislative history).
146
McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992).
144

147

Id.

148

Id.
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This latter objective can be accomplished in one of two ways. The
first way is by resolving the dispute, thereby relieving the court from
the burden of processing the plaintiff's claim. 14 9 The second is by
producing a factual record that can aid the court in processing a
claim. 150 Of course, whether or not an administrative review process
will actually yield this latter benefit depends on the level of detail and
the accuracy of the facts recounted in the written records of the administrative proceedings.
It is debatable whether application of the exhaustion requirement in § 1997e(a) to prisoners seeking damages that cannot be obtained through the grievance process would further the traditional
purposes of exhaustion. On the one hand, a strong argument exists
that exhaustion would not protect the correctional department's authority because in this context the department has no authority in
need of protection-no authority to grant the relief sought by the
prisoner. The contrary argument, of course, is that the agency, in
some cases, might be able to offer the prisoner some substitute relief
that would placate the inmate harmed by the correctional officials'
allegedly unlawful actions.' 5 1 The need for judicial review of correctional officials' actions would then be obviated.
The problem with this argument is that it would support the application of exhaustion requirements in cases in which the Supreme
Court has refused to require a plaintiff to exhaust administrative or
judicial remedies. For example, as the Court acknowledged in Clayton, processing the plaintiff's claim through the union's appeals procedures might have yielded a settlement offer whose acceptance
2
would have negated the need for court involvement in the dispute.0
Yet this possibility of substitute relief forestalling the need for litigation did not lead the Court to require the exhaustion of the claim
through the union's procedures. 153 Instead, the Court held that the
plaintiff need not exhaust administrative procedures from which he
could not obtain the particular relief, reinstatement to hisjob, that he
1
was seeking. 54
A related argument is that the exhaustion of a prisoner's claim
for damages through the grievance process will promote the other
purpose of exhaustion, judicial efficiency, by negating the need for
litigation, either because the prisoner accepts substitute relief or because the invalidity of the prisoner's claim becomes apparent to him
149
150

Id.
Id. at 145-46.

151 See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text (discussing the availability of altemative relief).
152
451 U.S. 679, 689 (1981).
153

Id.

154

Id. at 696.
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or her during the grievance process. 155 However, by finding in Clayton
that exhaustion would be a "useless gesture" when the plaintiff would
still have to file a lawsuit to obtain the particular relief he desired,1 5 6
the Supreme Court implicitly rejected this construction of how exhaustion furthers the purpose of promoting judicial efficiency.
Some courts have, however, held that requiring an inmate seeking damages to pursue his or her claim through the grievance process
promotes judicial efficiency by producing a factual record that facilitates the court's review of the prisoner's claim.1 5 7 In many states,
though, no such factual record is produced. As shown in Table 3,
more than half of the departments of corrections surveyed during this
study reported that when officials deny a grievance because a prisoner
is seeking relief that the grievance committee cannot award, grievance
officials do not prepare a written report discussing whether the prisoner has any grounds for his grievance and the facts supporting that
58
conclusion.

TABLE 3
STATES IN WHICH THE ADMINISTRATIVE GRIEVANCE PROCESS DOES NOT
PRODUCE A WRITIEN REPORT WHEN A PRISONER SEEKS UNAVAILABLE
MONETARY RELIEF

Arkansas
Delaware
Florida

Iowa
Kentucky
Louisiana

Montana
Nebraska
Nevada

Hawaii

Maryland

New Hampshire

South Dakota West Virginia

Indiana

Michigan

New Jersey

Tennessee

D.

Oklahoma
Oregon
Rhode Island

Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Wyoming

Other PLRA Provisions

The PLRA's exhaustion requirement was just one part of an Act
designed to curb the filing of frivolous lawsuits by prisoners and end
what was considered undue interference by the courts in the operation of correctional facilities. Because courts are generally supposed
155

See supra Part m.B.2(a) (i).

156

C/Yton. 451 U.S. at 693.

157

Eg; Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 76 (3d Cir. 2000); Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d

1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 1998).

158 This study did not independently verify the statements of the other departments of
corrections that they do prepare such a written report. For those states in which such
written reports are prepared, a representative cross-section of those reports would need to
be analyzed to determine whether they contain the level of detail that would meaningfully
facilitate a court's review of a prisoner's claim. In addition, the procedural safeguards that

attend the grievance process in each of those states would need to be examined to determine whether the safeguards are adequate to ensure that the factual findings of the grievance committee, if sufficiently detailed, are also generally accurate.
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to interpret the different parts of a statute so as to complement rather
than contradict each other,15 9 the question arises as to whether any of
the other PLRA provisions provide clues as to the import and meaning of the exhaustion requirement.
Like the answers to so many of the other questions regarding the
indicators of Congress's intent when enacting the exhaustion requirement, the answer to this question is inconclusive. On the one hand,
some prisoners' advocates might argue that the almost unbounded
interpretation of what constitutes a remedy when construing the
PLRA's exhaustion requirement conflicts with the constrictive interpretation of remedial relief found in other sections of the PLRA.
Under traditional principles governing remedies, the nature and
scope of what is considered a "remedy" is tailored to the nature and

scope of the injury that the relief is designed to redress. 160 This central principle permeates other parts of the PLRA, such as the provisions limiting the scope of prospective relief in conditions-ofconfinement cases. 161 It might therefore seem discrepant if administrative actions not linked to the injury for which recompense is sought
were considered "remedies" within the current meaning of the
PLRA's exhaustion requirement.
However, because the PLRA's restrictions on prospective relief
and the exhaustion requirement take very different tacks in limiting
the intervention of courts in correctional operations-the former, by
limiting the scope of court-ordered relief and the latter, by giving correctional officials first dibs in resolving an alleged problem in correctional operations-it might be a mistake to demand conceptual
consistency between these discrete portions of the PLRA. In fact, the
PLRA itself confirms that Congress did not consider administrative
remedies on a plane with court-ordered remedies. The PLRA gives a
court, at most, ninety days in which to rule on a motion to terminate
prospective relief in a conditions-of-confinement case, 162 even though
such motions can raise exceedingly complex factual and legal questions. In addition, a preliminary injunction issued in a conditions-ofconfinement case abates after ninety days. 165 In other words, the
court has only ninety days after issuing a preliminary injunction to
decide whether to issue a permanent injunction. By contrast, the
PLRA's exhaustion provision removed the previous 180-day deadline
SINGER, supranote 80, § 46.05.
See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 281-82 (1977) (referring to the "well-settled
principle that the nature and scope of the remedy are to be determined by the violation"),
161
18 U.S.C. § 3626(a) (1) (Supp. IV1998); see supra notes 15-16, 19-21 and accompanying text.
162
§ 3626(e) (2)-(3); see supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
159
160

2A

163

§ 3626(a) (2); see supra text accompanying note 18.
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for correctional officials to resolve a prisoner's grievance before court
adjudication of the prisoner's claim. 16
The PLRA's screening provisions might also arguably bear on the
meaning of its exhaustion requirement. 165 As mentioned earlier,' C
these provisions direct courts to dismiss prisoners' claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a cognizable claim, or seek relief from a
defendant protected by immunity, preferably before the complaint is
even docketed. Additionally, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(2) authorizes
courts to dismiss a claim on any of these four grounds even if a prisoner has not exhausted his or her administrative remedies. Thus, if
prisoners seeking monetary relief that they cannot obtain through the
grievance process do file frivolous claims, their claims presumably will
167
be quickly culled by the court.
Other provisions of the PLRA also create significant disincentives
to the filing of frivolous claims. If prisoners file such claims, they still
must pay the full filing fee, 16 even if the court summarily dismisses
their claims. 1 69 The prisoners also accrue a "strike" upon the dismissal of a frivolous lawsuit. Once they have accrued three such strikes,
the prisoners will generally be barred from bringing suit in forma
pauperis.7 0 The combined effect of the PLRA's screening mechanisms, filing-fee payment requirements, and three-strikes provision
suggests that the argument that exempting some prisoners from the
exhaustion requirement will dramatically undercut the PLRA's purpose of deterring prisoners from filing frivolous lawsuits is overstated.
Prisoners generally have everything to lose and nothing to gain by fling a frivolous lawsuit for monetary relief.
E.

Policy Considerations

One of the principal arguments for applying the exhaustion requirement across the board, whether or not the grievance process ac164 Prison ltigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L No. 104-134, sec. 803, § 7(a), 110
Stat. 1321-66, 1321-71 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a) (Supp. I 1997)); see supra
notes 70-72.
165
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b) (Supp. IV 1998); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)
(Supp. M 1997).
166
Supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
167
Before Congress enacted the PLRA, courts could dismiss sua sponte the frivolous
claims of prisoners who had petitioned the court to proceed informa pauperi. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(d) (1994). However, the decision whether to dismiss a claim sua sponte fell ithin
the court's discretion. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992).
168 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (1); see supra text accompanying notes 26-27.
169
E.g., Hains v. Washington, 131 F.3d 1248, 1250 (7th Cir. 1997) ("It would be absurd
if the very weakest complaints-those summarily throun out under § 1915A-%were costfree from the prisoner's perspective, while more substantial claims must be paid for.");
McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 1997 FED App. 0177P, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997); Leonard v. Lacy, 88 F.3d 181, 184-86 (2d Cir. 1996).
170
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); see supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
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cords prisoners the relief they are seeking, is that otherwise prisoners
will circumvent the exhaustion requirement by tacking on a claim for
damages to their court complaint and, if need be,' 7 1 deleting any
claim for injunctive relief.172 The way in which prison grievance pro-

cedures are currently structured suggests that, at least for the short
term, this is a legitimate concern. The forty-five departments of corrections surveyed for this study reported that prisoners in their state
either cannot obtain monetary relief through the grievance process or
can obtain such relief only for very limited types of claims, generally
for lost or damaged property and for miscalculated commissary

charges, state pay, medical co-payments, other fees, and release payments. 17 Only six states-Arkansas, Kansas, New York, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Wyoming-reported that prisoners can

recover monetary compensation through the grievance process for
medical claims beyond those seeking reimbursement for medical copayments. 174 No state's department of corrections reported that inmates can recover monetary damages through the grievance process

for correctional officials' excessive use of force or for unconstitutional
75

conditions of confinement.
On the other hand, whether § 1997e(a)'s exhaustion requirement is defeasible at the stroke of an inmate's pen is up to correctional officials and legislators. If they want to ensure that correctional

officials will have the first opportunity to resolve a prisoner's claim
before a court enters into a dispute, then they need only modify the

grievance procedures to allow for the awarding of monetary relief,
when appropriate, to prisoners. 176 Thus, the question really is: On
whom did Congress place the responsibility of ensuring that the ex-

haustion requirement applies in as many cases as possible? Has Congress placed the responsibility on the courts, which would require the
171 As mentioned earlier, the courts that exempt prisoners seeking damages from the
exhaustion requirement when monetary relief is unavailable are divided on whether the
exhaustion requirement applies to prisoners filing mixed claims for both damages and
injunctive relief. Supra note 6.
172 E.g., Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 74 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that prisoners will
"evade the exhaustion requirement" by seeking only damages); Perez v. Wis. Dep't of
Corr., 182 F3d 532, 537 (7th Cir. 1999) ("Section 1997e would not be worth much if
prisoners could evade it simply by asking for relief that the administrative process is unable
to provide."); Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 1998) (asserting that not
applying the exhaustion requirement because a prisoner is seeking damages would create
an "enormous loophole" in that requirement).
178
Grievance Procedure Survey, supra note 109.
174

Id.

Id.
Whitley v. Hunt, 158 F.3d 882, 887 (5th Cir. 1998) ("[T]here is nothing to prevent
Congress, and perhaps even the Bureau of Prisons, from enacting regulations that would
permit the recovery of monetary relief from individual prison officials." (footnote
omitted)).
175

176
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courts to deviate from the traditional rule that a remedy is inadequate
and need not be exhausted when it cannot provide the plaintiff the
relief he or she is seeking? Or has Congress placed the responsibility
on correctional officials and legislators, who can modify grievance
procedures and, when necessary, the law so that the exhaustion requirement applies to prisoners seeking only monetary relief.
F. Interpretive Principles-A Tie-Breaking Role?
One can selectively extrapolate arguments from the exhaustion
provision's language, history, purposes, and underlying policy considerations to either support or refute the applicability of the exhaustion
requirement to inmates seeking only monetary relief that cannot be
obtained through the grievance process. Indeed, the closeness of the
question confronting the courts leaves open the troubling possibility
that a court will resolve the question based on how the court believes
the question should have been resolved, had Congress addressed it,
rather than on the court's construction of the indecipherable intent
of Congress.
Canons of statutory construction can, however, provide courts
with a more principled basis for breaking the interpretive tie when
there are conflicting indicators of congressional intent. One canon
particularly pertains here-the rule that courts should not construe
statutes as abrogating the common law unless the legislature has
dearly manifested its intent that the statute is to have this effect. 177
This rule suggests that to the extent that there is doubt regarding the
applicability of the PLRA's exhaustion requirement to prisoners seeking relief that cannot be obtained through the grievance process,

courts should construe the requirement in keeping with longstanding
rules governing the exhaustion of administrative remedies. 178 In
other words, courts should interpret the PLRA as simply having
brought the exhaustion procedures applicable to prisoners into con177

See United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (noting the "principle that

'[s] tatutes which invade the common law ... are to be read with a presumption favoring
the retention of long-established and familiar principles, except when a statutory purpose
to the contrary is evident'" (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783
(1952))).
The force of this rule is particularly evident in the line of Supreme Court cases holding that certain government officials have absolute or qualified immunity from suit under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. K-g., Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 258 & n.18 (1931)
(citing cases addressing "immunities of varying scope under the statute"). The plain language of § 1983 states that "felvay person" who violates another's federal rights when acting under the color of state law "shall be liable." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. I1 1997)
(emphasis added). The Supreme Court has, however, repeatedly observed that § 1983
must be read in light of the immunities afforded by the common law at the time of§ 1983's
enactment. K-g., Fact Concer4 453 U.S. at 258-59.
178
See supraPart m.B.2(b).
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formance with the procedures applicable in other contexts, With this
change in procedures, prison officials need no longer demonstrate
the efficacy of the grievance procedures before a court can mandate
exhaustion. Instead, the exhaustion of administrative remedies is
mandatory unless the prisoner-plaintiff demonstrates that those remedies are inadequate or that exhaustion would be futile.

IV
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CORREGrIONAL OFMCIALS, COURTS,
AND CONGRESS

The Supreme Court or Congress will, in the end, resolve the
question of whether prisoners seeking damages must process their
claims through prison grievance procedures even when monetary relief cannot be obtained through those procedures. 179 Whatever the
ultimate decision on this issue, there are a number of lessons to be
learned from the torturous process of attempting to divine Congress's
intent when it enacted the PLRA's exhaustion requirement. Set forth
below are recommendations for correctional officials, courts, and
Congress that embody some of those lessons. These recommendations include, among others, suggested revisions in correctional grievance procedures, a modified approach for courts to follow when
construing substantive legislation inserted into appropriation bills,
and the appointment of a task force by Congress to assess the PLRA's
impact and the validity of its factual underpinnings.
A.

Recommendations for Correctional Officials

For years, many correctional officials have castigated the courts
for intruding into what the officials understandably consider their terrain-the operation of correctional facilities.' 8 0 The PLRA's exhaustion requirement represents, in effect, a passing of the baton to

correctional officials. Correctional officials now have the opportunity
to play the role for which they have clamored-resolving problems in
correctional operations and conditions of confinement that would
otherwise wind up on a judge's desk. The question for the correctional officials is: Will they avail themselves of the opportunity they
have sought for so long? Or will they just drop the baton?
179 At the time this Article went to press, the Supreme Court had granted certiorari in
Booth v. Churnerto resolve this question. 206 F.3d 289 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S.

Ct. 377 (2000).
180

E.g., Clair A. Cripe, Courts, Corrections, and the Constitution:A Practitioner'sView, in

COURTS, CORRECTIONS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION ON

PRISONS AND JAILS 268, 284 (John J. Dilulio, Jr. ed., 1990).
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As the Grievance Procedure Survey results indicate, 8 1 the evidence as to whether the correctional officials can and will catch and
hold onto the baton is, thus far, not encouraging. However, correctional officials can take steps to guard against the pendulum eventually swinging back towards greater court intervention in correctional
operations. These steps will protect the fundamental interest in en-

suring that correctional facilities are operating in conformance with
constitutional and other legal requirements, remit the administration
of correctional facilities to those persons trained to run correctional
facilities, and limit the time and money parties spend litigating, and
courts spend adjudicating, prisoners' claims. From a correctional perspective, the added benefit of taking the steps prescribed below is that
they hold great promise for dramatically improving correctional operations over the long run.
1. Recommendation: Correctional officials should revamp their
grievance procedures or develop other administrative mechanisms to
enable prisoners to recover monetary relief, when appropriate, without the need for litigation.
In almost all of the states, prisoners seeking monetary compensation for most violations of their rights generally have no choice but to
file a lawsuit, whether in state or federal court.'8 2 So even if the Supreme Court were to conclude that the PLRA exhaustion requirement
applies to prisoners even when they cannot obtain the monetary relief
they are seeking through the prison grievance process, that decision
would only defer the inevitable-the filing of lawsuits by many prisoners seeking damages. If correctional officials are therefore serious
about avoiding the burdens of litigation and the scrutiny of correctional operations by the courts, then the officials must develop a
means for prisoners to recover monetary redress without the need to
file a lawsuit.
Correctional officials have traditionally been skittish about the
idea of paying inmates money as redress unless ordered by a court to

do so.183 They worry that if they pay money to one inmate whose
grievance is legitimate, they will open a Pandora's box of unfounded
claims for compensation. In the correctional officials' minds, it is better to keep the monetary-compensation door closed than to open it
and be inundated by an avalanche of groundless claims for damages.
However, the experience of Corrections Corporation of America
(CCA) suggests that correctional officials' fears are exaggerated. CCA
is the largest private company providing correctional services to gov181
182

See supraPart IH.B.2 (a) (ii).
Supra text accompanying notes 173-75.

183 Telephone Interview with Linda Cooper, Vice-President of Legal Affairs, Corrections Corporation of America (Apr. 28, 2000).
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ernments at the local, state, and federal level.' 8 4 Since its inception,
CCA has, when appropriate, paid inmates money when needed to redress their legitimate grievances.18 5 According to their Vice-President
of Legal Affairs, the company has done this for three reasons.18 6
First, and most importantly, CCA pays inmates who have been
harmed by the wrongful actions or inaction of CCA officials because it
is simply the right thing to do.' 8 7 As CCA's Vice-President for Legal
Affairs explained in an interview: "If a prisoner establishes that due to
our negligence, his tennis shoes were lost, we will spend $40 to buy
him a new pair of tennis shoes. And we should because it was our
fault."'18
Second, correctional-management benefits accrue from "doing
the right thing." When prisoners perceive that they are being treated
fairly by their "keepers" and that correctional officials attempt, in
good faith, to make amends for their mistakes or misdeeds that cause
injury to inmates, the prisoners will be less likely to harbor the resentment against those officials that can make prisoners more difficult
and dangerous to manage. 18 9
Finally, providing recompense to inmates, when appropriate, for
injuries sustained when CCA employees violated their limited rights
has proven to be cost-effective for CCA. The Vice-President of Legal
Affairs for CCA underscored that reimbursing the prisoner was not
only the morally right thing to do, but the most prudent course of
action from an economic standpoint. 19 0 The vice-president contrasted CCA's approach to the resolution of legitimate grievances in
which inmates seek monetary relief with the response that has typified
the public correctional sector. She noted that while CCA will pay the
amount owed to the inmate, thereby avoiding the incursion of litiga,
tion expenses down the road, "an attorney who represents a Department of Corrections will spend $4,000 of the taxpayers' money to
avoid paying the prisoner $40."191
Of course, the economic benefits reaped by modifying a grievance process to make monetary compensation available in that process rather than through the more cumbersome and expensive
litigation process would be short-lived if such a modification triggered
184
185
186

Id.
Id.
Id.

187
188

Id.

LYNN S. BRANHAM, LIMITING THE BURDENS OF PRO SE INMATE LITIGATION: A TECHNI-

CAL-AssISrANCE MANUAL FOR COURTS, CORREaIONAL OmCIALS, AND ATrroItNm

233 (1997).
189 Telephone Interview with Linda Cooper, supra note 183.
190 BRANHAM, supra note 188, at 233.
191 Id.
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the filing of a sufficient number of spurious grievances to outweigh
those benefits. But CCA has found that there are ways to preserve the
economic benefits of reimbursing inmates to whom monetary compensation is rightfully due without inciting a wave of copycat grievances that would sap those economic benefits.
First, CCA does not pay damages to any prisoner who happens to
claim that CCA owes him or her money. Instead, a prisoner has the
burden of substantiating a claim for monetary redress before CCA will
92
pay the prisoner any money.'
Second, CCA utilizes confidentiality agreements to curtail the risk
that granting an inmate appropriate monetary relief will spur the filing of nonmeritorious claims for monetary compensation.19 3 One
stratagem employed by CGA is to stretch payment of the sum owed to
the prisoner over time. 19 4 If the prisoner then breaches the confidentiality agreement by disclosing the fact of the payment to any other
prisoners, the prisoner then forfeits his right to reimbursement.' 9 7
Prison officials can take still further steps to diminish the risk that
awarding damages to one prisoner will have a domino-like effect
throughout the prison. First, prison officials can work to enact legislation requiring a defined percentage of the monetary award to be used
to pay the prisoner's outstanding financial obligations, such as for restitution, child support, and room and board at the correctional facility. This legislation could also require correctional officials to remit
the remainder, or a large part of the remainder, of the compensation
award into a special savings account for the prisoner. The money in
the account could, at least generally,' 96 be reserved to ease the inmate's transition back into society upon his or her release from
prison.
An additional step that correctional officials can take to avoid
opening a Pandora's box of baseless grievances is to make the filing of
a false grievance or the making of a false statement during the grievance process a disciplinary infraction. If correctional officials were to
take this step, however, they would need to exercise care so as not to
192

Telephone Interview with Linda Cooper, supra note 183.

193

Id.

'94
195

Id.

Id. CCA also encourages grievance officials to be "creative" in finding vm)s to compensate inmates. Id. At one CCA-operated facility, for example, an inmate entitled to $80
in compensatory relief received a $10 credit each month for eight months at the prison

commissary. Id.
196

The vast majority of prisoners are eventually released from prison. Only a small

percentage of convicted felons sentenced to prison receive life sentences. &ezJodi M.
Brown et al., Fdony Senientes in State Courts, 1996, BuxAru oFjusr. STAT. BuLL (U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Washington, D.C.), May 1999, at 3 (noting that only 1.2% of convicted state
felons sentenced to prison in 1996 received life sentences). Even some of these prisoners
will be released on parole or have their sentences commuted.
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deter the filing of well-founded grievances.' 9 7 It would be imperative,
for example, that a prisoner's failure to prevail on a grievance not be
considered tantamount to the filing of a false grievance. A prisoner
might simply and, due to the difficulty of amassing evidence while incarcerated, understandably have been unable to prove the verity of his
or her claim even though the claim asserted in the grievance was indeed true.
2. Recommendation: Correctional officials should refine their
grievance processes by linking those processes to a structured mechanism for the identification and resolution of systemic problems at the
institutional and departmental level that give rise to prisoners' grievances and lawsuits.
The officials who process prisoners' grievances typically address

only the narrow questions raised by the individual grievance before
them: Was this particular prisoner inappropriately denied a visit with
his mother? Did prison officials wrongfully confiscate an item found
in this particular prisoner's cell? Was this particular prisoner, who was
nearing completion of an eighteen-month educational program,
properly transferred to another prison that did not offer such a
program?
As they are currently constructed, prison grievance processes are
much like the boy who plugged the hole in the levee with his thumb
during a storm. Like the boy, the prison officials appear, on the surface, to have resolved the problem before them-in the case of the
prison officials, by granting or denying the grievance. But in fact they
have often done no such thing. The floodwater (the problem) is still
mounting nearby, and the levee (the correctional system) will undoubtedly sprout new leaks (more grievances and lawsuits) until the
problem is resolved. Of even greater concern, the unresolved problem will continue to impair the efficiency or effectiveness of correctional operations and potentially jeopardize institutional security.
An innovative problem-solving mechanism developed by the Missouri Department of Corrections highlights the distinction between
resolving the issues raised by an individual grievance and solving the
underlying problems. Dora Schriro, the Director of the Missouri Department of Corrections, created this mechanism, known as the Constituent Services Office, in 1994.198
. One purpose of the Constituent Services Office
is to reduce the
99
number of lawsuits filed by prisoners.1 But Director Schriro de197 Addressing the problems underlying such grievances could substantially improve
the management of correctional facilities.
198 Mo. DEP'T OF CORR., CONSITUMENT SERVICES OFFICE 1998 ANNUAL R PoRT 1 (1999).
199

Mo. DEP'T OF CORR., INNOVATIVE GOVERNMENT PROGRAM GETS RESULTS FOR Mis.

souRI PRIsoN Sysrms 1,

6 (1998).
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scribes this goal as the subsidiary purpose of the Office.20 0 According
to her, the overarching purpose is to identify and address what she has
described as the "root causes" of prisoners' legitimate complaints,
thereby improving the service the Department provides to what it considers its "customers'"-prisoners, their families, legislators, the Gover20 1
nor's Office, advocacy groups, and others.
The way in which the Constituent Services Office responded to
one prisoner's complaint illustrates its problem-solving focus. This
particular prisoner contacted the Constituent Services Office after
prison officials refused to let his mother into the prison for a visit even
though she had traveled two hundred miles to see him.2 0 2 The prison
officials cited the prison's visiting rules in barring the mother's entry
into the prison; the mother's dress, which was two inches above her
knee, was too short, under those rules, to permit her to visit a prisoner.20 3 While wearing the same dress, the mother had, however,
been permitted to visit her son when he was incarcerated in a different prison in the state.20 4
Had the prisoner in this case filed a grievance regarding the refusal to let his mother visit him, his grievance, most likely, would have
been summarily denied because the prison officials had acted in conformance with prison regulations. But the Constituent Services Office
adopted a different tack when addressing the prisoner's complaint,
examining whether the Department of Corrections could take steps to
prevent a recurrence of the problem the prisoner had brought to its
attention.
Having received a number of other complaints from prisoners
and their family members about visiting procedures, the Constituent
Services Office assembled a task force to review visiting procedures
within the Department. 20 5 What the task force discovered was that
those procedures varied widely from prison to prison and that there
was no justification for those variations. 20 6 The end result of this discovery was the formulation of uniform visiting procedures for all pris20 7
ons throughout the state.
200

In an interview with the author, Director Schriro observed: "Litigation is a symptom

of a problem. Ifyou stop the litigation, you don't stop the problem." BiANmH,,
188, at 234.
201

Id. at 59.

202
203

Id

204

Id at 66.

205

Id- at 65.

supranote

M at 65-66.

206 Id
207 Id. at 66. The collaborative process through which these procedures were adopted
further reflects the Constituent Service Office's problem-solving orientation. The Inmate
Visiting Task Force first administered surveys to obtain information about the visiting polk

des and procedures in each prison in the state. Id. Then, the task force's draft polides
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The Constituent Services Office, and the task force assembled
under its auspices, unearthed another problem that had contributed
to the prisoner's mother having been denied entry into the prison.
Not only were the rules governing visitation conflicting, but many prisoners and their families were unaware of those rules. 20 8 Only upon
their arrival at the prison would family members learn that they could
not visit their loved one because they were dressed inappropriately or
that there were restrictions on the medical and infant supplies visitors
20 9
could bring into the visiting room.
The task force responded to this problem by preparing a handbook for prisoners, their family members, and friends outlining the
Department's visiting procedures. 210 The handbook also contains the
answers to questions frequently asked by prisoners' friends and family
members, such as whether clothing and other items can be sent to a
prisoner, whether money can be deposited in a prisoner's account,
and how mail to a prisoner should be addressed. 21 1 Each prisoner can
identify up to two persons to whom the handbook will be sent at the
21 2
Department of Corrections' expense.
In order for prison grievance procedures to realize their potential to avert litigation, correctional officials need to develop linkages
between the grievance process and problem-solving mechanisms like
the Constituent Services Office within the Missouri Department of
Corrections. At this point, we do not know the most efficient and
effective way to structure such linkages, partly because the Constituent
Services Office is itself a novel correctional concept. By piloting and
evaluating different ways to integrate a structured process for identifying and resolving systemic problems in correctional operations with
the grievance-resolution process, correctional officials can identify the
most effective ways of resolving not only grievances but the problems
underlying those grievances.
Whatever form the linkages ultimately take, though, to be effective, they need to contain at least two basic components. The first is a
statistics-gathering and evaluation component. Statistics about the
grievances prisoners file can be a prime indicator of problems brewing within the correctional system. Changes in the types of grievances
and procedures were circulated to the superintendents (wardens) and inmate councils of
each prison for comments and suggested revisions. Id.
208 Id. at 65.
209

Id.

Id. at 66. The Missouri Department of Corrections printed an updated handbook
in 1999. Mo. DEP'T OF CORR., FOR FAMILY AND FRIENDS: A GUIDE TO ANsvER YOUR Qus,
TIONS ABOUT THE MissouRI DEPARTMENT OF CORIuCrONS (1999).
211 Id. passim.
210

212

Telephone Interview with LisaJones, Constituent Services Officer, Missouri Depirt.

ment of Corrections (Apr. 27, 2000).
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filed, such as increases in the grievances filed concerning medical
care, excessive use of force, or access to religious programming, can
identify focal areas for assessment and problem-solving initiatives.
Similarly, increases in the number or types of grievances at particular
prisons can flag facilities for priority intervention.
The collection by correctional departments of the kinds of statistics recounted above is not uncommon. 213 However, what is not yet,
but should be, the norm is for these statistics to be funneled to an
entity whose core purpose is to identify and resolve the problems in
correctional operations that often lie below the surface of prisoners'
grievances and complaints.
The transmission of grievance statistics to a problem-solving entity would not alone suffice to avert, to the extent possible, the filing
of lawsuits by prisoners who initially filed grievances in conformance
with the PLRA's exhaustion requirement. The second necessary component of the linkages between the grievance process and this problem-solving entity is to funnel information to the Constituent Services
Office or similar entity about individual grievances filed by prisoners
so that an assessment can be made as to whether a grievance, even if
technically nonmeritorious, reflects a deeper problem that the Department of Corrections needs to address. This grievance-review process would be undertaken not for the purpose of overruling the
decisions of grievance officials in individual cases but in order to identify and resolve problems in correctional operations that may underlie
those grievances.
Correctional officials could effectuate the grievance-review function in a variety of ways. One possibility would be to funnel all grievance reports to the Constituent Services Office. Another possibility
would be to train grievance officials in the identification of grievances
that should, on a selective basis, be forwarded to the Constituent Services Office for problem-solving review and assessment. A third possibility would be to assign a Constituent Services Officer to work within
the grievance process. The participation of a Constituent Services Officer in the grievance process would foster a two-dimensional review of
a prisoner's grievance: first, to determine if redress should be formally
granted or denied, and second, to determine if there are problems
the grievance has brought to light that warrant follow-up.

213 In 1997, the author completed a study for the American Bar Association under a
grant from the Bureau ofJustice Assistance on ways to limit the burdens of pro se inmate
litigation. See BiR'sA., supra note 188. During this project, the author received copies of
grievance statistics collected by thirteen departments of corrections surveyed as part of the
study. E.g., OFcE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., FLA. DWP'T OF CORR., MoN"Im REPORT (Nov.
1996).
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3. Recommendation: Correctional officials should evaluate the
lawsuits filed by prisoners to determine whether improvements can be
made in correctional operations in general and the operations of the
grievance process and the Constituent Services Office, or similar entity, in particular.

The lawsuits filed by prisoners are a rich source of information
regarding the effectiveness of correctional officials' efforts to avert litigation through the administrative resolution of prisoners' grievances
and the problems underlying those grievances. By examining these
cases on an individual basis and determining why they ended up in
court, correctional officials will be able to identify additional steps that
they can and should take to augment and improve the operations of
the grievance process and the Constituent Services Office or related
entity. In addition, correctional officials can identify and resolve
problems in correctional operations or conditions that were not resolved, but should have been resolved, during or as an outgrowth of
the grievance process.
B. Recommendations for Courts
The findings of this study suggest the need for courts to take two
steps, first, to reduce the flow of conditions-of-confinement cases into
the courts, and second, to limit the number of instances when courts
have to engage in a guessing game of statutory construction. The first
step is administrative in nature, while the second relates to the canons
of statutory construction.
1. Recommendation: To facilitate the administrative problem
solving that can, in the long term, reduce inmate litigation, courts
should work with correctional officials to develop a process for providing copies of prisoners' complaints, including those dismissed sua
sponte, to the correctional officials.
The conditions-of-confinement cases filed by prisoners can be divided into four categories. The first group of cases consists of those in
which the prisoners have raised legally meritorious claims and are entitled to remedial relief.214
214 E.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 681 n.3, 682 (1978) (upholding issuance of an
injunction in case in which an average of four, but sometimes up to eleven, prisoners were
confined in filthy, windowless cells in punitive isolation, and inmates were raped so frequently in the inmate barracks that some inmates would not sleep in their beds and instead
clung during the night to the bars near the correctional officers' station); Blissett v. Coughlin, 66 F.3d 531, 537 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming award of $150,000 in compensatory and
punitive damages to prisoner who was kicked and beaten by correctional officers and then
confined naked in a feces-smeared cell); Grimm v. Lane, 895 F. Supp. 907 (S.D. Ohio

1995) (awarding two inmates beaten by correctional officers a total of $460,800 in compensatory and punitive damages).
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The second group of cases are those in which the prisoners have
raised legally meritorious claims in the sense that their rights have
been violated, but the prisoners are not entitled to remedial relief.
An example of such a case would be one in which a prisoner's rights
were abridged by prison officials, but the prison officials whom the
prisoner has sued for damages are immune from damages liability. 2 15
Another example is an inmate whose constitutional rights were violated but whose claim for compensatory damages is foreclosed by the
216
PLRA's physical-injury requirement.
The third category of cases is comprised of those in which the
prisoners' claims are not legally meritorious but have some substantive merit. An example of such a case would be one in which prison
officials have violated their own regulations, but the violation has not
abridged any constitutional rights. 2 17 The cases falling within this category are not confined to those in which prison officials have overtly
erred. This category of cases also includes those cases in which the
officials have acted in conformance with their own rules, policies, and
procedures, but those rules, policies, or procedures need to be revised. Also included in this category are cases in which the prison
officials followed their rules and the rules are in no need of revision,
but prisoners do not understand the rules or their rationale because
of poor communications between prison officials and the prisoners.
In short, the cases falling within this category, though legally nonmeritorious, raise claims stemming from problems that correctional officials should address and resolve.
The fourth and final category of conditions-of-confinement cases
includes cases which are not only nonmeritorious from a legal standpoint, but substantively specious.2 18 These cases are not the outgrowth of any problems that correctional officials should rectify. At
least some of these cases, no doubt, are filed simply to harass the correctional officials whom the prisoners consider responsible for their
detested captivity.
215 R-g., Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that although the
disclosure of inmate's transsexuality abridged her constitutional right to privacy, the defendant was entitled to qualified immunity).
216 E.g., Zehner v. Trigg, 133 F.3d 459 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that physical-injury
requirement barred suit seeking compensatory damages for emotional distress sustained
by prisoners exposed to asbestos); supra text accompanying notes 30-31.
217 Eg., Presler v. Mfich. Dep't of Corr., No. 96-2148, 1997 WL 693057, at *1 (6th Cir.
Oct. 21, 1997) (table opinion, full text available on Westlaw) (finding that a prisoner did
not receive a hearing, as required by state law, within four days after being transferred to
administrative segregation, but concluding that a state does not have "'a federal due process obligation to follow all of its procedures'" (quoting Levine v. Torvik, 986 F.2d 1506,
1515 (6th Cir. 1993))).
218 Eg., Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025 (7th Cir. 2000) (dismissing as frivolous a claim
alleging that the United States and China had conspired to invade the prisoner's mind
with a mind-reading and mental-torture device).
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In all but the latter type of case, a Constituent Services Office or
similar entity can perform a valuable problem-solving function. In addition, as mentioned earlier in this Article, 219 correctional officials
ought to evaluate the lawsuits filed by prisoners to determine whether
there are steps that they can take to improve the grievance process or
to augment the problem-solving capacity of the Constituent Services
Office or related entity.
There are currently two impediments to such problem solving
and evaluation. First, the PLRA authorizes courts to dismiss sua sponte
a number of different prisoners' claims-those that are legally frivolous, those that are malicious, those that fail to state a claim for which
relief can be granted, and those seeking monetary relief from a defendant with immunity from damages liability. 220 As a result, many prisoners' complaints are dismissed before process has been served and
never reach correctional officials' desks.
The other encumbrance to correctional officials' review of the
lawsuits filed by prisoners is the peripheral role that correctional officials so often play in the litigation process, except during some settlement negotiations. The current prevailing mind-set is that the
handling of prisoners' claims falls within the Attorney General's bailiwick once those claims are asserted in the form of a lawsuit not dismissed by the court sua sponte. The focus is on the elimination of the
lawsuit through, for example, the filing of a motion to dismiss or a
motion for summary judgment, rather than on the elimination of any
problem that prompted the lawsuit.
This legalistic approach to prisoners' claims, while perhaps understandable, is short-sighted. In part because inmates are so very ignorant of the law,22 1 lawsuits raising the same or similar claims will
continue to be filed until the problems underlying those claims are
rectified.
The development of the kinds of linkages discussed earlier between the grievance process and the Constituent Services Office or
similar entity would help to diminish the effects of the two impediments to correctional problem solving and evaluation discussed
above.2 22 When inmates' claims are subject to the PLRA's exhaustion
219
220

Supra Part IV.A.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) (2), 1915A(b) (Supp. IV 1998); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) (Supp.

III 1997); see supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
221 The National Center for Education Statistics reported in 1994 that seven out of
every ten inmates perform at the lowest literacy levels. KARL 0. HAIGLER ET AL., U.S. DEP'T
OF EDuc., LrrERAcy BEHIND PRISON WALLS; PROFILES OF THE PRISON POPULATION FROM THE
NATIONAL ADULT LrTERAcY SURVEY, at xviii, 17-19 (1994). As a result, the majority of In-

mates have tremendous difficulty "integrat[ing] or synthesiz[ing] information from complex or lengthy texts," essential skills for effective litigation. Id at xviii.
222 See supra notes 198-213 and accompanying text.
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requirement, the new problem-solving orientation of the grievance
process fostered by these linkages should lead to the resolution of
problems and the averting of lawsuits that would otherwise be filed if
those problems were not resolved. So if these linkages are in place,
correctional officials may often or generally have had the opportunity
to resolve the problems underlying lawsuits of which they may be unaware or in which the Attorney General has assumed a predominant
role. The extent to which they will have had this opportunity will depend on whether monetary relief is available through the grievance
process and, even if it is not, whether the exhaustion requirement has
been construed to apply to claims for such relief.
Even if the exhaustion requirement were deemed to apply to all
prisoners' claims, there will, however, almost inevitably be some cases
that fall through the cracks of the problem-solving system erected by
the department of corrections and end up in court. The department
therefore needs a backup system to identify and address any un-

resolved problems percolating below the surface of these cases. As
mentioned earlier, 223 this review process would have the added benefit of identifying ways in which correctional officials can improve the
grievance process and the operations of the Constituent Services Office or related entity.
In order for this backup system to work, however, the prison officials charged with the responsibility of addressing and resolving the
problems underlying prisoners' complaints need to be aware of these
complaints. While the Attorney General can develop linkages with
the Constituent Services Office or similar entity, this collaboration will
do nothing to facilitate problem solving and evaluation in cases a
court dismisses sua sponte, cases of which the Attorney General will
generally be unaware.
Courts can properly fill in this gap by working with correctional
officials to develop a process for funneling copies of prisoners' civil
rights complaints to correctional officials. The development of such a
feedback mechanism for correctional officials would not be inappropriate because the complaints filed in court are a matter of public
record. Nor is such cooperation between courts and correctional officials in administrative matters without precedent or even unusual.
Many departments of corrections have, for example, worked with
courts to develop ways to reduce the time spent and costs incurred in
22 4
serving process on current or former employees sued by prisoners.
Courts and correctional officials have worked together to implement
223

See supra Part IV.A

BRmm.i, supra note 188, at 222-26. In Utah, for example, one employee at each
state prison accepts process for any employees at the prison sued by a prisoner. Id. at 222.
224
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video-conferencing in prisoners' cases. 225 Courts have also appointed
task forces, comprised not only of court officials, but of correctional
officials and others, to identify ways in which to streamline the
2 26
processing of prisoners' claims.
Any residual concerns that some judges might harbor about perceived impropriety in this interbranch cooperation on administrative
matters could be dispelled by including a prisoner's advocate in the
discussions on the development of the feedback mechanism. During
those discussions, details such as what complaints will be copied, who
will make the copies, and who will pay the photocopying costs would
need to be resolved.
2. Recommendation: Courts should adopt and augment statutory
construction rules, particularly the rules governing the interpretation
of substantive statutes inserted into appropriation bills, to encourage
deliberative decision making by Congress and to limit the need for
courts to resolve questions regarding a statute's meaning that Congress, in the first instance, should have resolved.
The congressional legislative process is, at least in theory, a twopart process. 22 7 During one part of the process, Congress decides
what policies and programs it should put in place, eliminate, or revise. 22 8 These decisions, like all decisions of import, are best made
after careful reflection and full consideration of the relevant facts, law,
and policy considerations. And because significant differences of
opinion often arise regarding the facts, law, and policy considerations
bearing on a particular issue, gaining a full and accurate understanding of an issue requires consideration by Congress of differing
perspectives.
For these and other reasons, Congress has, by its rules, entrusted
various standing committees with the responsibility of reviewing proposed legislation falling within their jurisdiction, holding hearings on
legislative proposals, and refining those proposals before their consideration by either the full Senate or House of Representatives. 2 2 9
Members of the committees to whom these proposals are referred
have developed expertise in the areas over which their committees
exercise jurisdiction. Examples of some of the subject matters falling

225
226

i&. at 208.
E.g., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY COMMITrE ON PRO SE PRISONER LITIGATION,

UNITED STATES DISTrICT COURT FOR THE Dismaur OF NEvADA (1995).
227 WALTERJ. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS

ed. 1996).
228 I.
229 Id. at 9, 110-12.

57

(4th

2001]

THE PRISON LTIGATION REFORM ACT

533

within the expertise of these specialized committees include agriculture, the environment, national defense, and veterans.2 30
The second part of the lawmaking process is the appropriations
stage.231 The question that is supposed to be addressed and decided
during the appropriations process is: How much money will be appropriated to effectuate the policy and programmatic decisions already
made by Congress. Under the rules of both the House of Representatives and the Senate,2 3 2 policy and programmatic decisions are generally not supposed to be made during this stage of the lawmaking
process. The question for Congress at this point is not "What will we
do?" but rather "How much will we pay?"
In recent years, Congress has increasingly breached this supposed
dividing line between policymaking and fiscal allocations.23 Instead
of waiting for a proposal, particularly a controversial proposal, to be
vetted before standing committees in both the Senate and the House
and during floor debates in each chamber of Congress, members of
Congress simply insert it into an appropriations bill. This practice enhances the likelihood both that the proposal will be enacted and that

it will be enacted without any significant revisions. By bypassing the

standing committees, the proponent of the legislation can avoid the
kind of in-depth scrutiny that might reveal problems in the proposed
law, such as flawed premises or an imbalance among competing considerations. Additionally, the need, sometimes urgent, for funds to be
disbursed through appropriations legislation thwarts careful review of
230 [106th Cong. 1999-2000] 1 Cong. Index (CCH) 12,051-13,101 (2000) (listing committees of the Senate); [106th Cong. 1999-2000] 2 Cong. Index (CCH) 26,151-27,301
(2000) (listing committees of the House of Representatives).
231 OLxszEx, supra note 227, at 9, 110-12.
232 Rules of the House of Representatives, Rule XXI, cd. 2(b), in Cauuxs NWJoisox,
CoNsrTIoN, JEFFERsoN's MANu AND RuLas OF THE HOUSE OF RRErsE.-rAThts 783
(1999) ("A provision changing exdsting law may not be reported in a general appropriation
bill."); Rule XXI, ci. 2(c), inJoHNsoN, supra,at 783 ("An amendment to a general appropriation bill shall not be in order if changing existing law."); Standing Rules of the Senate,
Rule 16.4, in SENATE MANUAL CONTAINING THE STANDING RuLES, O ERs, Lw,, AND RESOLLrIONS AFFECTING THE Busnmss OF THE UNUTED STATES SENXATE 14-15 (1995). The Senate
Rule states:
On a point of order made by any Senator, no amendment offered by any
other Senator which proposes general legislation shall be received to any
general appropriation bill, nor shall any amendment not germane or relevant to the subject matter contained in the bill be received; nor shall any
amendment to any item or clause of such bill be received which does not
directly relate thereto.
Id
233
See, eg., Sandra Beth Zellmer, Sacrtfidng LgislatleIntegrity at the Altar ofApppriations Riders: A ConstitutionalCrisis, 21 HAuv. ENvrr. L REv. 457,486-89 (1997) (listing examples of appropriations riders changing environmental policies, including a rider to the
appropriations bill for the Department of Defense halting the listing of species as endangered under the Endangered Species Act and a rider exempting the Trans-Maska oil pipeline from requirements in the National Environmental Policy Act).
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the fine-print of these often mammoth bills, making it less likely that
2 4
Congress will sift out ill-advised substantive amendments.
But is this circumvention by Congress of its own rules a proper
concern of the courts? The answer, in a word, is yes.
The end result of this circumvention of processes designed to
promote deliberative decision making is a greater likelihood that laws
will contain gaps, ambiguities, and conflicting provisions unrecognized by Congress. These gaps, ambiguities, and conflicts will, in turn,
provoke litigation that will place the responsibility of filling in these
gaps and resolving these ambiguities and conflicts on the courts.
This burden-shifting has increased the courts' workload as courts
have labored to discern the meaning and scope of poorly drafted statutes. But the repercussions of Congress's failure to follow its own
rules go well beyond the distribution of work between the legislative
and judicial branches of the government. For what is ultimately at
stake here is not the distribution of workloads between the two
branches, but the distribution of power.
As is true with all products of human endeavor, statutes, particularly statutes on complex subjects, will rarely, if ever, be drafted with
perfection. It is virtually impossible to anticipate and provide an answer to every question that will be raised regarding a statute's meaning
and scope. But to the extent that Congress follows procedures designed to promote deliberative decision making, statutes will be more
clearly drafted and less likely to contain as many of the gaps and inconsistent provisions that provoke litigation. Conversely, to the extent
that Congress permits these procedures to be skirted, power will shift
to the courts as the courts resolve questions that Congress, under its
procedures, should have resolved.
What the courts therefore need to do is to adopt a more clearly
defined differential approach to the construction of substantive statutes that have been woven into appropriations bills. The Supreme
Court has already said that the rule that courts should not readily find
that Congress, by enacting one statute, has implicitly repealed another
statute applies with special force to appropriations bills. 23 5 Yet in determining whether a provision in an appropriations bill has effected a

change in the substantive law, the Supreme Court has shown itself

234
See infra text accompanying notes 244-48 for a discussion of the federal budgetary
crisis that spurred the enactment of the omnibus appropriations bill into which Congress
inserted the PLRA.
235
United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 221-22 (1980); Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437
U.S. 153, 190 (1978).
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willing to dig deeply below the surface of the provision in the appropriations bill in an attempt to ascertain its meaning.2 6
The courts can, however, and indeed should, adopt a different
approach when construing substantive statutes embedded in appropriations bills. If it is evident from the statute's "plain meaning" that
the substantive provision changes the law, then the courts should, of
course, give effect to that change. But if the statute's meaning is not
evident, the court should not engage in a kind of Holy Grail search
for what, in the appropriations context, is so often a mythical congressional intent. Instead, the courts should confine the statute's application to the situations to which it dearly applies and those only. If

Congress wanted or wants the statute to have a broader scope, then
Congress can enact a statute clarifying its intent.
Precedent supports this kind of approach to court adjudicationrefusing to resolve an issue by parsing together bits and pieces of information from extraneous sources. In Miranda v. Arizona,23 7 the Supreme Court held that police officers must generally administer a set
of four warnings to a suspect before subjecting that individual to custodial interrogation. The suspect must be apprised that he has the
right to remain silent, that anything he says can and will be used
against him in court, that he has a right to have an attorney with him
while he is being questioned, and that if he cannot afford an attorney,
one will be appointed to represent him before he is interrogated.2 S
The Court underscored in Miranda that in order for statements obtained during custodial interrogation to be admissible in evidence, a
prosecutor must generally adduce proof that the warnings were administered to a suspect and that the suspect validly waived his or her
rights under Miranda before the custodial interrogation
23 9
commenced.
The Supreme Court, however, treated the consequences of failing to administer the fourth warning-the warning of a right, in certain circumstances, to appointed counsel-somewhat differently. If
the suspect had an attorney or dearly had the funds to hire an attorney, the failure to administer this warning would not be fatal to the
confession's admissibility.240 The Court forewarned police, though,
that if there was "any doubt" regarding whether a suspect had the fi-

nancial resources to pay for an attorney, the courts would not delve
236

K-g., Tenn. Valy Auth., 437 U.S. at 189-93 (examining the legislative history of an

appropriations measure to determine whether it exempted a dam from the requirements
of the Endangered Species Act).
237

384 U.S. 436 (1966).

238
239

Id. at 479.

240

I&
Id- at 473 n.43.
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into the matter further.2 4 1 If the police had not given the suspect the
fourth warning, the suspect's statements would be suppressed even if a
further inquiry by the court would have revealed that the suspect, in
fact, had the financial resources to procure an attorney at the time of
the interrogation.
Similar to the approach followed when determining whether the
fourth warning requirement of Mirandahas been met, courts can limit
the scope of the inquiry they undertake when divining the meaning of
substantive statutes incorporated into appropriations bills. The vary-

ing precedential effect the Supreme Court gives its own decisions also
provides arguable support for applying different rules when construing riders inserted into appropriations bills. When an issue has been
fully briefed and argued before the Supreme Court, the Court's ruling
on that issue is a precedent to which the courts, including the Supreme Court, are bound, unless the Court later overrules its decision.
But if the Supreme Court renders a decision without full briefing and
argument, it considers itself less obligated to treat that decision as a
binding precedent.2 42 And if a statement in a Court opinion is dictum,
not pertinent to the resolution of the issue before the Court, the state2 43
ment has no precedential effect.
The distinction between the Supreme Court's calibrated approach to judicial construction of its own opinions and a calibrated
approach to judicial construction of statutes is that courts are bound
by the laws enacted by Congress, whether embodied in an appropriations bill or enacted as a freestanding bill. In this sense, it is not the
prerogative of the courts to refuse to give effect to a statute whose
meaning is clear or to give the statute limited effect simply because
the procedures which led to its enactment were irregular or flawed.
But if a statute's meaning is not clear and the statute was enacted
as part of an appropriations measure, thereby thwarting the kind of
in-depth review through which the statute's meaning might have been
clarified by Congress, a court has two choices. The court can embark
on an analysis of the statute's legislative history, its purposes, its relationship to other statutory provisions, and other indicia of legislative
intent in an attempt to determine what the statute means and its intended scope. The end result of this inquiry may be that the court is
actually able to deduce what Congress's intent was when enacting the
particular statutory provision. When interpreting vague or ambiguous
statutes slipped into appropriations bills, though, the more likely result is that the court will end up guessing what Congress would have
241
242
243

Id.

See, e.g., Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 251 (1998).
E.g., Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 412-13 (1997); Local 144 Nursing Home
Pension Fund v. Demisay, 508 U.S. 581, 592 n.5 (1993).
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wanted to do had it taken the time to consider the issue before the
court. In making this determination, the distinct likelihood exists that
a court's prediction of what Congress would have done will be heavily
influenced by the court's own opinions about what should have been
done.
Alternatively, the court faced with questions regarding the meaning of a substantive provision inserted in an appropriations bill can, as
courts do in the Mirandacontext, place limits on the depth of itsjudicial inquiry. By limiting the application of the appropriations rider to
the situations to which it dearly applies, the court will, in effect, be
remitting to Congress the legislative responsibility of resolving the policy questions that Congress skirted because of the provision's insertion

into an appropriations bill. Not only would this form of judicial restraint be more in keeping with the division of labor and power between the judicial and legislative branches of the government, but it
would promote deliberative congressional decision making by providing Congress with an incentive, when enacting laws, to folow the procedures it has devised to foster such deliberation.
C. Recommendations for Congress
This study has pointed to two problems that need to be addressed
by Congress. The first relates to the way Congress currently functions,
or rather, at times, malfunctions. The second relates to one particular
product of nondeliberative lawmaking--the Prison Litigation Reform
Act.
1. Recommendation: Congress should revamp its procedures to
promote deliberative decision making and to limit judicial involvement in, and resolution of, policy disputes that Congress should
resolve.
As mentioned earlier, the PLRA was attached as a rider to an omnibus appropriations bill. 244 This bill was the byproduct of Congress's

failure in 1995 to enact eight of the thirteen annual appropriations
bills funding federal agencies. 245 This failure was largely attributable
to the inclusion of riders in those bills concerning such controversial
issues as abortion, environmental regulation, and prisoner

litigation.246

Congress's failure to enact these appropriations bills led to a
budgetary crisis and two government shutdowns, for a week in Novem244
Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L No
104-134, 110 Stat. 1321; se alsosupranote 11 and accompan)ing text (discussing the legislative history of PLRA).
245
Zelimer, supra note 233, at 507-09.
246 Id at 508-09.
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ber of 1995 and twenty-one days during December and January. 47
Congress then used stopgap measures-"mini" continuing resolutions-to fund the government until the omnibus appropriations bill
was finally enacted in April of 1996.248 Buried in the fine print of that
bill was the PLRA.
Some members of Congress decried Congress's cryptic review of
the provisions of the PLRA.2 49 But the way in which the PLRA was
moved through, or in these critics' opinions, rammed through, Con-

gress is not atypical.
This circumvention of existing procedures designed to promote
deliberative decision making comes at great cost. First, the failure to
thoroughly review legislative proposals leads to mistakes-to the making of policy choices based on a lack of relevant information or even
misinformation.
Second, the incomplete, and sometimes cursory, review of legislative proposals leads to the enactment of poorly drafted laws-laws filled with gaps, inconsistencies, and ambiguities. 250 This leads to a
third problem to which this Article has already alluded: the need for
judicial intervention to fill in these gaps, reconcile inconsistent statutory provisions, and decipher the meaning of ambiguous laws. This
Id. at 508 n.289.
Id. at 509.
E.g., 142 CONG. REc. S2296 (1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy), reprinted in 1
REAMS & MANz, supranote 11, at Doc. No. 23. Senator Kennedy stated:
Although a version of the PLRA was introduced as a free-standing bill
and referred to the Judiciary Committee, it was never the subject of a committee mark-up, and there is no Judiciary Committee report explaining the
proposal. The PLRA was the subject of a single hearing in the Judiciary
Committee, hardly the type of thorough review that a measure of this scope
deserves.
Id.; see also id. at S2297 (statement of Sen. Simon), rerintedin 1 RzF-is & MANZ, supra note
11, at Doc. No. 23 ("I am very discouraged that this legislation was considered as one of
many issues on an appropriations bill. Legislation with such far reaching implications certainly deserves to be thoroughly examined by the committee ofjurisdiction and not passed
as a rider to an appropriations bill."); 141 CONG. Rzc. H14,098 (1995) (statement of Rep.
Mollohan), reprinted in 1 REAMs & MANz, supra note 11, at Doc. No. 18. Representative
Mollohan stated:
The issues raised by these three legislative proposals are in thejurisdiction
of the Committee on the Judiciary. These items include a major legislative
rewrite of the Truth in Sentencing initiative grants, prison litigation reform
and Legal Services Corporation. All these provisions amend current law
and have impacts that are not clearly defined, despite the claims of the
Committee on theJudiciary. The reasons they have ended up in this appropriations bill are unclear to me, because as far as I know, we still have a
Committee on the Judiciary with an especially competent chairman and
ranking member, and I see no reason why an appropriations bill should
247
248
249

contain such extensive authorizing language.

Id.

250
For examples ofjust some of the many questions concerning the PLRA with which
the courts have wrestled and on many of which they are divided, see infra text accompanp
ing notes 259-68.
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intervention is costly in terms of the drain on judicial resources. It is
also inefficient since it requires multiple courts to struggle to resolve
issues-often inconsistently-that Congress, with a degree of forethought, could have anticipated and resolved.
A fourth, and related, problem that ensues from the effectual
transfer to the courts of the responsibility of resolving questions that
Congress, in the first instance, should have resolved is that it decreases
legislative accountability. By leaving the resolution of sometimes controversial issues to the courts, members of Congress can avoid being
held responsible for unpopular decisions. Additionally, by acquiescing to the insertion of substantive laws into appropriations bills, members of Congress can avoid having to take a specific stand on an issue
for which they might later be held politically accountable.
Finally, the skirting of procedures designed to promote deliberative decision making is divisive. Following procedures through which
differing viewpoints can be fully aired is more likely to foster the consensus-building through which legislative proposals are refined. By
contrast, the perception that legislative proposals are being railroaded
through Congress produces fractiousness and impedes the dialogue-

both between members of Congress themselves and between members of Congress and key constituency groups-that can facilitate the
making and implementation of sound policy choices. In addition, to
the extent that members of Congress and others feel excluded from
crafting and enacting legislative proposals, they may opt to process
their own proposals through Congress in a way that generally insulates
them from in-depth scrutiny and, in turn, promotes even greater divi-

sions within Congress.
It is not within the purpose or scope of this Article to propose

exactly how Congress should refine its procedures to promote deliberative decision making. Suggestions to improve the functioning of Congress should be canvassed, and the soundness of these and other ideas

need to be examined in great depth. But clearly, as is evident from
the circumstances surrounding the PLRA's enactment, a priority area
upon which Congress should focus its attention is the process through
which substantive laws are inserted into, and enacted as part of, appropriations bills.
2. Recommendation: Congress should authorize a broad-based
task force to collect relevant facts about inmate litigation and litigation alternatives and to assess the effects of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Congress should also direct the task force to develop
recommendations regarding appropriate steps that Congress, other
branches of the federal government, and state and local governments
should take, including possible revisions to the PLRA, to limit the bur-

dens of inmate litigation in ways that rectify problems in correctional
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operations and ensure that inmates' legal rights are protected and
enforced.
This recommendation is basically a recommendation that Congress do what it should have done back in 1996-collect the facts regarding inmate litigation before developing policy responses to that
litigation. And because Congress has, through its enactment of the
PLRA, already enacted a series of policy responses to inmate litigation,
this recommendation also calls on Congress to initiate an assessment
of the effects of the PLRA and of the need, if any, to revise or supplement the PLRA.
Some of the questions that should be addressed during this assessment process include the following:
1. To what extent, both before the PLRA was enacted and afterwards, have cases contesting conditions of confinement in correctional facilities led to the release of inmates from adult and juvenile
correctional facilities? The PLRA's restrictions on the issuance of prisoner-release orders were enacted based on the assertions of witnesses,
during congressional hearings, that lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of conditions in correctional facilities had led to the widespread release of dangerous inmates into the community.2 5 1 This
study would assess the verity of these assertions and the impact the
PLRA has had on the release of inmates in order to bring facilities
into compliance with legal requirements.
2. How long has it taken to implement remedial orders granting
prospective relief in cases involving the conditions of confinement in
adult and juvenile correctional facilities, and what are the reasons for
any delay in the implementation of those orders? The sections of the
PLRA providing for the termination of prospective relief were
grounded on the assumption that correctional facilities operate under
court order for prolonged periods of time because ofjudicial aggrandizement-because judges are eager to exercise power over correctional operations and are unwilling to relinquish control of
correctional facilities to state and local officials when appropriate to
do so. 25 2 This study would ascertain the extent to which, if at all,
there are facts supporting this assumption. 25 3 The study would also
251
See, e.g., PLRA House Hearings,supra note 12, at 260 (statement of Lynne Abraham,
District Attorney, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania) (testifying that over one hundred people
have been murdered in Philadelphia by inmates released because of a prison population

cap).

252 See, e.g., 141 CONG. REc. S14,419 (statement of Sen. Abraham), reprinted in I RLMis
& MANz, supra note 11, at Doc. No. 15 (expressing one senator's hope that the PLRA's

termination provisions would help end the administration of prisons by judges eager to
intervene in the "minutia of prison operations").
253 Two facts to be considered when assessing the causes for lengthy court oversight of
correctional facilities are whether and when the defendants, in cases in which correctional
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determine the extent to which, if at all, delays in vacating court judgments in conditions-of-confinement cases are attributable to other
2 54
causes.
3. To what extent do there exist effective, alternative means,
other than litigation, of ensuring that conditions of confinement in
adult and juvenile correctional facilities are constitutional? Are there
additional alternatives that could be adopted, or refinements that
could be made in existing alternatives, to achieve this objective?
4. What are the trend data regarding the filing of conditions-ofconfinement cases by state and local inmates, both in terms of the
number of such lawsuits and the rate at which they have been filed?
To what extent did increases in the number of lawsuits filed before
the PLRA was enacted correspond with increases in the size of the
inmate population in jails and prisons? And to what extent do the
trend data for filings by federal prisoners differ from the trend data
for filings by state and local inmates and why?
As the PLRA and its precursors moved through Congress, a few
members of Congress and several witnesses testified before congressional committees that there had been an "explosion" in the number

of conditions-of-confinement cases filed by prisoners.2

5

The study

would determine whether these statements accurately depicted the litigation trends. 256 More importantly, the answers to the questions set
forth above would unveil some of the basic facts about inmate litigafacilities are operating under a court order, have filed a motion to terminate the court's

supervision or a motion to vacate the court's judgment.
254 For a contrasting view regarding the source of the problem, at least in one particular case, see Glover v.Johnson, 934 F.2d 703 (6th Cir. 1991). The court there noted.
The history of this case shows a consistent and persistent pattern of obfuscation, hyper-technical objections, delay, and litigation by exhaustion on the
part of the defendants to avoid compliance with the letter and the spirit of
the district court's orders. The plaintiff class has struggled for eleven years
to achieve the simple objectives of equal protection under the law generally, and equality of opportunity specifically.
Id. at 715.
255 See, ag., 141 CONG. Rxc. S7524 (statement of Sen. Dole), reprinted in 1 RF&%ts &
MAIz, supra note 11, at Doc. No. 7 ("Over the past two decades, we have itnessed an
alarming explosion in the number of lawsuits filed by State and Federal prisoners.").
256 There is preliminary evidence suggesting that these statements of purported facts
were incomplete at best and erroneous at worst. For example, between 1980 and 1995, the
year before the PLRA's enactment, the number of civil rights suits filed by state and local
inmates increased 227%, climbing from 12,397 in 1980 to 40,569 in 1995. AD.uN. OmncF
OF THE U.S. COURTs,JUDicIAL BusrHEss OF THE UNrrE STATES CoumRS 145 thl.C-3 (1995);
ADNMN. OFFIcE OF THE U.S. CouRTS, REPORTS OF THE PRocEDrISs OF THEJ!DIcIAL CoNFR.ENCE OF THE UN=TED STATES 232 thl21 (1980). During that same time period, however, the
number of state prisoners alone increased by 237%. Christopherj. Mumola & Allen J.
Beck, Prisonersin 1996, BuREnAu OFJUSTr. STAT. Buu.m (U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Washington,
D.C.),June 1997, at 3 tbl.3; Prisonersin 1981, BuR.-U OFJuST. STAT. BuLL. (U.S. Dep't of

Justice, Wash., D.C.), May 1982, at 3 thl.1.

542

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:483

tion needed by Congress to assess the soundness of policy measures
enacted, or to be enacted, in response to inmate litigation.
5. To what extent has the dismissal of prisoners' claims for legal
frivolousness changed since the PLRA's enactment? To what extent
are prisoners claims, including legally frivolous claims, substantively
frivolous? In other words, to what extent do they involve no issues or
arguable problems that correctional officials should address? And to
what extent do the claims brought by prisoners proceeding pro se differ from the pro se claims of nonprisoners in terms of the percent
dismissed for frivolousness and failure to state a claim for which relief
can be granted and the percent on which the plaintiffs ultimately
prevail?
The PLRA was enacted, in part, to address what its proponents
described as a burgeoning problem of prisoners' frivolous claims inundating courts. 257 The answer to the first question set forth above
will determine whether that claim was exaggerated and reveal the impact the PLRA has had on the rate at which prisoners file frivolous

claims. The answer to the second question will help to clarify whether
correctional officials need to adopt additional problem-solving mechanisms to avert the filing of lawsuits challenging correctional operations or conditions. And the answer to the third question will lend
perspective to policyrnakers as they assess the extent to which the
processing of prisoners' civil rights claims by courts should differ from
the processing of nonprisoners' claims.
6. To what extent are inmates with meritorious legal claims able
to obtain redress for the violation of their federal rights? What are the
obstacles that impede inmates with meritorious claims from obtaining
such redress, and what are the comparative costs and benefits of removing those obstacles?
The discussions of inmate litigation that preceded the PLRA's enactment were clearly one-sided, centering on the problems that were
allegedly caused by that litigation and what could be done to alleviate
those problems. A more balanced review of the subject would include, first, an analysis to determine the extent to which these
problems-for example, of judicial micromanagement-do indeed
exist. But a thorough analysis of the subject of inmate litigation would
not be confined to an assessment of the burdens stemming from that
See, e.g., 141 CONG. REc. S18,136 (1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch), nprinted in 1
supra note 11, at Doc. No. 20 ("This landmark legislation will help bring
relief to a civil justice system overburdened by frivolous prisoner lawsuits."); PLRA House
Hearings,supranote 12, at 208 (statement of Robert H. Macy, District Attorney, Oklahoma
City, Oklahoma) ("Countless thousands of frivolous claims are filed in both State and Federal court by parties [prisoners] who are motivated by anger or greed and have nothing to
lose."); PLRA Senate Hearing, supra note 12, at 3 (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("Frivolous
257

REms & MYANz,

prisoner lawsuits are reaching crisis proportions.").
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litigation. A comprehensive analysis would also examine the extent to
which the principal purpose of litigation-the remedying of the harm
caused by illegal conduct-is achieved in prisoners' civil-rights litigation, the impediments to the realization of that purpose, and costeffective steps that can be taken to ensure that in sifting out the
"chaff" of inmates' claims, courts do not sift out the "wheat" as well.
7. What issues have the courts confronted regarding the PLRA's
meaning, scope, and constitutionality? How have these issues been
resolved, and on what issues are the courts divided?
It is ironic that the PLRA, an Act purportedly designed to curb
the burdens of inmate litigation, has itself spawned so much litigation.
Perhaps because of the haste with which the PLRA was enacted, courts
have been confronted with numerous questions regarding the Act's
meaning and scope. In addition, a number of constitutional challenges have been asserted against various PLRA provisions.253
Just a few examples of the many statutory questions with which
the courts have wrestled, and frequently disagreed about, include:

Who has the burden of proving whether an inmate has or has not
exhausted administrative remedies?2 9 How does the exhaustion requirement apply to inmates who missed the deadline for filing a grievance? 26° Under what circumstances, if any, can prisoners file
conditions-of-confinement lawsuits when correctional officials have

258 Constitutional challenges have been mounted against the PLRA's filing-fee requirements, see, eg., Tucker v. Branker, 142 F.3d 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1998), its three-strikes provision, see, eg., Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 1999), its screening provisions, see,
e.g., Christiansen v. Clarke, 147 F.3d 655 (8th Cir. 1998), its physical-injury requirement,
see, e.g., Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1998), its termination provision, see e.g., Benjamin v. Jacobson, 172 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. CL 72
(1999), its automatic-stay provision, see, eg., Miller v. French, 120 S. Ct. 2246 (2000); and its

restrictions on attorney's fees, see, e.g., Madrid v. Gomez, 190 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 1999).
259 Thus far, the courts have answered this question in three xays. The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals has held that the prisoner-plaintiff has the burden of alleging and proving that he or she exhausted available administrative remedies. Brown v. Toombs, 1998
FED App. 0092P, 139 F.3d 1102, 1104 (6th Cir. 1998). The Courts of Appeals from the
Fifth and Tenth Circuits have held that whether or not a prisoner has exhausted administrative remedies is determined on the pleadings without proof; in other words, the plaintiff
need only adequately allege exhaustion. Underwood v. Wilson, 151 F.d 292, 296 (5th Cir.
1998); Basham v. Uphoff, No. 98-8013, 1998 WL 847689, at 04 (10th Cir. Dec. 8, 1998)
(table opinion, full text available on Westlaw). Finally, the Second and Seventh Circuits
have held that the defendants have the burden of pleading and proving a prisoner's failure
to exhaust. Massey v. Helman, 196 F.3d 727, 735 (7th Cir. 1999); Jenkins v. Haubert, 179
F.3d 19, 28-29 (2d Cir. 1999).
260 Several courts have dismissed a claim for failure to exhaust even though tie time
for filing a grievance had expired. Eg., Lee v. O'Brien, No. 98-3868, 2000 W. 353141, at
-1 (7th Cir. Mar. 22, 2000) (table opinion, full text available at Westlaw); Hartsfield v.
Vidor, 1999 FED App. 0406P, 199 F.3d 305, 308-09 (6th Cir. 1999).
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delayed the processing of their grievances? 26 1 Once the money in a
prisoner's trust-fund account exceeds ten dollars, can the sum due

from a prior month for the filing fee be withdrawn even if the withdrawal brings the amount in the account below ten dollars? 262 How, if
3
at all, do the filing-fee requirements apply to released prisoners? 2 6 If
a prisoner files a notice of appeal and an application to proceed in
forma pauperisand that application is denied, must the full filing fee be
paid if the prisoner does not pursue the appeal?2 4 Can a prisoner be
afforded an opportunity to amend his or her complaint before it is
dismissed sua sponte for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted? 265 Does the physical-injury requirement bar lawsuits for
compensatory damages in which prisoners allege a violation of their
First Amendment or procedural due process rights? 26 6 Does the phys-

ical-injury requirement apply to claims for punitive damages? 267 And
should the maximum hourly rate used when computing the attorney's
fees to be awarded prevailing prisoner-plaintiffs in conditions-of-confinement cases be based on the compensation rate authorized by the
261 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that administrative remedies are exhausted once the time limits prescribed by regulations for the prison's response have expired. Undenvood v. Wilson, 151 F.3d 292, 295 (5th Cir. 1998).
262 The Fifth and Sixth Circuits have answered this question in the affirmative. Johnson v. McNeil, 217 F.3d 298, 302 (5th Cir. 2000); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 1997 FED App,
0177P, 114 F.3d 601, 606-07 (6th Cir. 1997).
263 Some courts have held that when an indigent prisoner files an appeal shortly
before being released from prison, the former prisoner must pay the initial partial filing
fee. E.g., Gay v. Tex. Dep't of Corr. StateJail Div., 117 F.3d 240, 242 (5th Cir. 1997); In re
Smith, 114 F.3d 1247, 1251 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Robbins v. Switzer, 104 F.3d 895, 898 (7th Cir.
1997). Other courts have held that the PLRA's prepayment requirements do not apply to
released prisoners. E.g., McGore, 114 F.3d at 612-13; McGann v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin.
96 F.3d 28, 30 (2d Cir. 1996).
264 The courts are divided on this question. Some courts have held that the prisoner
must pay the full fee in these circumstances. E.g., Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 484
(8th Cir. 1997); Newlin v. Helman, 123 F.3d 429, 433 (7th Cir. 1997); Leonard v. Lacy, 88
F.3d 181, 186 (2d Cir. 1996). Other courts disagree. E.g., Smith v. District of Columbia,
182 F.3d 25, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
265 Most courts have held that a prisoner must generally be afforded the opportunity
to amend unless the deficiency in the complaint cannot possibly be cured. E.g., Shane v.
Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 117 (3d Cir. 2000); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-30 (9th Cir.
2000); Gomez v. USAA Fed. Say. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795-96 (2d Cir. 1999); Perkins v. Kan.
Dep't of Corr., 165 F.3d 803, 806 (10th Cir. 1999); Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d
1342, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998). But see
McGore, 114 F.3d at 612 (concluding that a court must dismiss the complaint without affording the prisoner the opportunity to amend it).
266
Some courts have held that the physical-injury requirement does not apply to such
claims. E.g., Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 781-82 (7th Cir. 1999); Canell v. Lightner, 143
F.3d 1210, 1213 (9th Cir. 1998). But see Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 985 (11th Cir.
2000) ("The clear and broad statutory language does not permit us to except any type of
claims, including constitutional claims.").
267
GompareDavis, 158 F.3d at 1348 (yes), with Allah v. A1-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 253-54
(3d Cir. 2000) (no), andFlanery v. Wagner, No. 98-3235, 1999 WL 314615, at *2 (10th Cir.
May 19, 1999) ("not necessarily") (table opinion, full text available on Westlaw).
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Judicial Conference under the CriminalJustice Act (CJA) or the lower
rate at which Congress has been appropriating funds under the

CJA?26

8

By examining PLRA-related litigation, a task force can identify issues on which clarification is needed from Congress. An examination
of the case law triggered by the PLRA can also yield a better understanding of the PLRA's implications and help to identify how it might
be refined and improved.
8. What additional steps, if any, should Congress and other
branches of the federal government take to reduce the costs of inmate
litigation in ways that will rectify problems underlying that litigation
and ensure that inmates' legal rights are protected? In addition,
what, if any, additional steps can state and local governments take to
reduce inmate litigation in ways that promote proactive problem sol'ing and enforce the legal rights of prisoners?
The obvious point here is that the study of inmate litigation and
the PLRA's effects should culminate in a set of recommendations
upon which congressional hearings should then focus. Because a
study would adduce many facts that should have been collected and
considered before enacting a piece of legislation as far-ranging as the
PLRA, it is possible that some of these recommendations would call
for revisions in the PLRA itself.
CONCLUSION

If the PLRA's exhaustion requirement had no statutory predecessor, the task of deciding whether or not the requirement applies to
prisoners seeking exclusively monetary relief that cannot be obtained
through the grievance process would be a much easier one. The
meaning of the "available" administrative "remedies" that a prisoner
must exhaust would be construed against the backdrop of longstanding rules governing the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Under
these rules, plaintiffs need not process a claim through an administrative tribunal if they cannot obtain the type of relief they are seeking
from that tribunal. This interpretation of the exhaustion requirement, under which "administrative remedies" mean something different than "administrative grievance procedures," would also be in
keeping with the different terminology found in subsections (a) and
(b) of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
What muddles all of this is that § 1997e(a) modified an existing
exhaustion provision, one that outlined certain requirements that
prison grievance procedures had to meet before a court could require
268
Compare Hernandez v. Kalinowki, 146 F.3d 196, 201 (3d Cir. 1998) (appropriated
rate), with lick v. Miler, 68 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1174 (D. Nev. 1999) (authorized rate).
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a prisoner to pursue a claim through the grievance process. The question raised by those modifications is whether the deletion of the statutory predicates to exhaustion-including the requirement that the
grievance process be found by the Department ofJustice or a court to
meet certain statutory requirements or to be otherwise "fair and effective"-means that a prisoner can be required to exhaust administrative remedies even when those remedies cannot repair or avert the
harm of which the inmate complains. In other words, did this change
in the statute's wording effectively abolish, in the prison context, the
longstanding "futility exception" to exhaustion requirements?
If that question is answered in the affirmative, the repercussions
of that modification in the law go far beyond the specific question
addressed in this Article: whether a prisoner who is seeking exclusively
monetary relief and cannot obtain such relief through the grievance
process must process the claim for damages through the grievance
process. For there are other instances when processing a claim
through the grievance process would be futile or the remedies available to the prisoner palpably inadequate under the circumstances. For
example, in some emergency situations, a prisoner might face an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm that will come to fruition without immediate court intervention. If the deletion of the
reference to "plain, speedy, and effective" remedies and the other
changes in the exhaustion provision wrought by the PLRA are
changes of substantive, rather than procedural, significance, then it is
arguable that even the prisoner facing immediate peril that will cause
269
irreparable harm is subject to the exhaustion requirement.
The question whether prisoners seeking monetary relief only
must pursue their claims through grievance procedures that do not
afford such relief is one with which the courts will continue to grapple
until the Supreme Court or Congress provides a definitive answer.
However this question is ultimately resolved, the filing of prisoners'

lawsuits for damages will continue unabated, although the filing date
may be deferred because of the application of the exhaustion requirement. Until correctional officials revamp their grievance procedures
to enable prisoners to recover monetary relief without having to file a
lawsuit, the grievance process will, for many prisoners, simply be one
more pit stop on the way to the courthouse door. And unless correc269
This is particularly true because the PLRA deleted the CRIPA requirement that
grievance procedures, to be certified, had to provide for the "priority processing" of emergency grievances, including those involving a substantial risk of physical harm. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997(e) (b) (2) (C) (1994), amended by Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.
104-134, sec. 803, § 7, 110 Stat. 1321-66, 1321-70 to 1321-73 (1996). SeeJackson v. District
of Columbia, 89 F. Supp. 2d 48, 61 (D.D.C. 2000) (holding that exhaustion requirement
applies even though prisoners will suffer irreparable harm while prison official process
their grievance).
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tional officials also incorporate proactive problem-solving mechanisms
into the grievance process, they will have to continue to process grievances and defend against lawsuits stemming from problems in correctional operations that they could have, but failed to, resolve.
The larger problem with the PLRA, though, is the lack of forethought with which it was enacted. This Article has addressed this
problem by recommending that Congress examine the facts about inmate litigation and determine whether, based on those facts, the
PLRA should be revised. More fundamentally, this Article calls on
Congress to study and modify its procedures so that legislative proposals are, in the future, scrutinized with the care needed to ensure that
statutes are dear, have minimal gaps, and embody sound and factbased policy decisions.
Courts frustrated with trying to interpret the PLRA have lashed
out at Congress for what the judges dearly consider Congress's
shoddy work in drafting the statute. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted: "When Congress penned the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995,. .. the watchdog must have been dead."27 0 Another
court has castigated Congress for its "terrible blunders in legislative
drafting."27 1 But the views of Judge Evans from the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals perhaps best reflect what is becoming increasingly
evident about the Prison Litigation Reform Act: "I always thought the
PLRA was supposed to make the handling of prisoner litigation more
efficient. If that's its goal, and this sort of thing is its result, Congress
should go back to the drawing board."27 2 Soon.
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McGore 114 F.3d at 603 (citation omitted). In McGore, the court of appeals

ex-

plained the genesis for this observation: "The statute contains typographical errors, creates
conflicts with the Rules of Appellate Procedure, and is internally inconsistent. Moreover,
the year in its name, 1995, does not correspond to the date of its enactment, 1996. We
have even issued an unprecedented administrative order in an attempt to organize the
chaos." Id. (citations omitted).
271
Clohessy v. St. Francis Hosp. & Healthcare, No. 98 C 4818, 1999 %L46898, at *2
n.3 (N.D. MI.Jan. 28, 1999) (commenting on the absence of any language in title 28 recognizing the right of nonprisoners to sue infonma paupelis).
272 Hyche v. Christensen, 170 F.3d 769, 771 (7th Cir. 1999) (Evans,J., concurring). In
Hyche, Judge Evans also observed. "I'd say that when an experienced districtjudge... is
reversed three times in the same case on a little point like this, something is rotten in
Denmark." Id.

